
A Precious Garland

*A Commentary on [Shantideva's]
'Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva'
(Bodhisattvacharyavatara)*

by the Abbot Dragpa Gyaltzen

CHAPTER NINE

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Chapter Nine The Perfection of Wisdom

3B2B-2B3D. How to train in wisdom, the entity of special insight {375}

3B2B-2B3D-1. Explanation of the text of the chapter

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3B2B-2B3D-1. Explanation of the text of the chapter

3B2B-2B3D-1A. Teaching that those who desire liberation must generate the wisdom realizing suchness

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3B2B-2B3D-1A. Teaching that those who desire liberation must generate the wisdom realizing suchness

9.1 The Muni taught all these branches
 For the purpose of wisdom.
 Therefore, those who desire to pacify suffering
 Should generate wisdom.

Those who desire to pacify the suffering of cyclic existence of oneself and others should generate the wisdom that realizes suchness. This is because the Tathagata Buddha Muni taught all these branches, that is, the collections of causes – generosity and so forth which have been explained above – for the purpose of generating the wisdom that realizes suchness.

3B2B-2B3D-1B. Method for generating wisdom

3B2B-2B3D-1B1. Presentation of the two truths

3B2B-2B3D-1B2. Establishing that even those who desire to attain mere liberation need to realize emptiness

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3B2B-2B3D-1B1. Presentation of the two truths

3B2B-2B3D-1B1A. Actual

3B2B-2B3D-1B1B. Dispelling objections that there is no need and ability for emptiness

3B2B-2B3D-1B1A. Actual

9.2 The concealer (the conventional) and the ultimate
 Are asserted to be the two truths.
 The ultimate is not an object of utilization of the mind.
 The mind is said to be a concealer.

9.3 With respect to them, the supports of the transitory¹⁸⁴ are seen {376}
 To be of two types: yogis and common people.
 Among them, common supports of the transitory
 Are damaged by yogi supports of the transitory.

9.4ab Even yogis, due to differences in their minds,
 Are damaged by the successively higher.

The first line [9.2c] indicates the characteristics of ultimate truth while the second [9.2d] the characteristics of concealer truth. The two – the former and the latter minds – [mentioned in

¹⁸⁴ *Jigs rten* is translated as “support of the transitory.”

9.2cd] are minds that have dualistic appearances; they are not mere minds. Further, they are taken in terms of the mode of comprehension. Hence, correlating them in this way, the basis for characterization – the voidness of inherent existence of the person and the aggregates – characterizes ultimate truth.

With respect to the direct valid cognizer mind that explicitly realizes it, it [ultimate truth] is not an object of utilization of that by way of dualistic appearances and is an object to be known by the direct valid cognizer comprehending it. This is of identical meaning to [Chandrakirti's] explanation in the *Supplement to the Middle Way (Madhyamakavatara)* (stanza 6.29):

*Whatever wrong entity of falling hair and the like
Is conceptualized through the force of cataracts,
The real nature in which it is seen by correct eyesight
Is reality. Likewise it should be known here.*

The bases for characterization – the person and the aggregates – are said to be concealer truths. With respect to the direct valid cognizer mind that explicitly realizes them, they should be realized by way of dualistic appearances.

With respect to the persons who wish to determine the two truths, {377} the supports of the transitory are persons imputed in dependence on the aggregates and are seen to be of two types: (1) yogis possessing the meditative stabilization that is a union of calm abiding and special insight who realize all phenomena to be empty of inherent existence, and (2) common people who are Propounders of [Truly Existent] Things. This [categorization] is in terms of the main [groups]; even persons who have realized emptiness by way of hearing and contemplation and those have not transformed their minds with tenets¹⁸⁵ should be included in these categories too.

Common supports of the transitory who assert partless particles, partless instants of consciousness, and the true existence of mere things are yogis, but are also supports of the transitory. Hence, the person who is a yogi support of the transitory realizing the lack of inherent existence damages the Propounders of [Truly Existent] Things of a lower tenet system. Even higher yogis [possessing] a union of calm abiding and special insight damage the successively lower ones.

The Middle-Way proponents (Madhyamikas) refute through reasoning the Mind-Only proponents (Chittamatrins) who assert that the consciousness is truly existent. They [the Mind-Only proponents, in turn] refute through reasoning the Sutra-School proponents (Sautrantikas) who accept partless particles.

QUALM: Among the yogis who realize emptiness, do they not damage each other?

RESPONSE: Even among the yogis who realize emptiness, due to differences in their minds, those abiding on the higher grounds, such as the second ground, damage, that is, outshine, those abiding on the lower, such as¹⁸⁶ the first ground. {378} You should understand through inference that, in terms of a single continuum, due to differences in the enhancement of the

¹⁸⁵ P. 592 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa's commentary explains that persons who have realized emptiness by way of hearing and contemplation should be included in group (1) and those have not transformed their minds with tenets in group (2).

¹⁸⁶ *Pa*s emended to read *pa*.

mind, for example, that unable to damage seeds that are objects of abandonment of the path of meditation on a lower ground can damage them on a higher ground.

The purpose of composing these passages is as follows: having ascertained minds to be of two types – minds that realize the conventional and minds that realize the ultimate, if even a valid cognizer realizing the conventional does not damage a mind realizing the ultimate, then what need to mention about it being damaged by adherents of partless particles? This is for the sake of making known that the mind realizing the ultimate damages all that hold to extremes.

Furthermore, even [among] yogis, due to differences in minds:

- the reasonings of the Great-Exposition proponents (Vaibhashikas), the Sutra-School proponents, and so forth damage the assertions of permanence and [truly existent] things made by the Outsiders [i.e., non-Buddhists],
- the reasonings of the Mind-Only proponents and so forth damage the assertions of partless particles made by the two Propounders of [Truly Existent] Objects [i.e., the Great-Exposition proponents and the Sutra-School proponents],
- the reasonings of the Middle-Way proponents damage the assertions of the consciousness being truly established made by the Mind-Only proponents,

and so forth. You should understand that the counterfeit meanings in the theses of the lower tenet systems are damaged by the reasonings of the successively higher tenet systems. The above explanation is the assertion of the *Great Commentary*.

3B2B-2B3D-1B1B. Dispelling objections that there is no need and ability for emptiness

3B2B-2B3D-1B1B-1. Actual

3B2B-2B3D-1B1B-2. Dispelling damage with regards to that

3B2B-2B3D-1B1B-1. Actual

9.4cd By way of analogies that both assert,
Because one does not analyze for the sake of a result.

9.5 Mundane beings¹⁸⁷ see things and
Conceive them to be real,
Not illusory, therefore here {379}
Yogis and mundane beings debate.

OPINION: That the tenet systems of common beings are damaged by the reasoning of the yogis who realize that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence is untenable. For, there is nothing to prove the lack of inherent existence, and in the absence of inherent existence, it will be meaningless to train in generosity and so forth for the sake of the result buddhahood.

RESPONSE: It follows that it is not that there is nothing to prove the lack of inherent existence, because, by means of analogies such as dreams and illusions that are renowned to both the Middle-Way proponents and the Propounders of [Truly Existent] Things as false and that both assert, the lack of inherent existence is established in dependence on them. It follows that in the absence of inherent existence, it will not be meaningless to train in generosity and so forth, because, although generosity and the like (for the sake of attaining a result such as buddhahood) lack true existence, one engages in them by way of being

¹⁸⁷ *Jigs rten pa* is translated as “mundane being.”

conjoined with the wisdom realizing them as false and illusory without investigation and without analysis. For, if the wisdom realizing the lack of inherent existence is not conjoined, then the remaining perfections do not obtain the name “perfection,” and they must travel to the city of omniscience together with a guide of the blind.

OPINION: For instance, fire that is able to perform the function of boiling, burning, and so forth is established by a direct perceiver. If you also accept this, then we are saying “This is truly existent,” whereby we have no object to debate about. However, if you do not accept this, {380} then there will be much damage, such as contradiction by a direct perceiver.

RESPONSE: These are debates of those who hold the two truths as contradictory, thinking that “If things lack inherent existence, then they will be utterly non-existent, and if they exist, then they must exist inherently.” Although the [mundane]¹⁸⁸ Middle-Way proponents and the mundane Propounders of [Truly Existent] Things both see with valid cognition things such as fire and accept them, the Propounders of [Truly Existent] Things conceive and accept them to be established as real, but do not understand them to be empty of true existence and illusory. On the other hand, the Middle-Way proponents understand this, therefore here the Middle-Way yogis and the mundane Propounders of [Truly Existent] Things debate. Alternatively, apply the former “mundane beings” [in 9.5a] only to the Propounders of [Truly Existent] Things [and not to the Middle-Way proponents].

3B2B-2B3D-1B1B-2. Dispelling damage with regards to that

3B2B-2B3D-1B1B-2A. General refutation of the Propounders of [Truly Existent] Things

3B2B-2B3D-1B1B-2B. Specific refutation of the Mind-Only proponents

3B2B-2B3D-1B1B-2C. Dispelling the consequence that the Middle-Way proponents lack the need and ability for a mind that realizes emptiness

3B2B-2B3D-1B1B-2A. General refutation of the Propounders of [Truly Existent] Things

9.6 Forms and so forth, although [established by] direct perceivers,
 Are so by renown, not by a valid cognizer.
 They are false, just like the unclean and so forth
 That are renowned to be clean and so forth.

9.7 For the sake of engaging mundane beings,
 The Protector taught things. In thusness
 They are not momentary.
 “There is contradiction even conventionally.”

9.8 There is not the fault in yogis’ conventionalities.
 That is seeing of thusness relative to mundane beings;
 Otherwise, their definite understanding of women as unclean
 Would be damaged by mundane beings. {381}

9.9 Merit [arises] with respect to illusory victors,
 Just as with respect to things.
 “If sentient beings are illusory,

¹⁸⁸ There is a little ambiguity in the Tibetan as to whether the word “mundane” applies also to the “Middle-Way proponents,” but from the overall context it is seen that it should.

Having died, how are they reborn?"

- 9.10 For as long as those conditions aggregate,
For that long will illusions also arise.
Why should sentient beings be truly existent
Due merely to long continuity?
- 9.11 An illusion being who kills and the like,
Has no negativity because it has no mind.
With respect to those who possess illusion minds,
Merit and negativity arise.
- 9.12 Because mantras and so forth lack the ability,
Mind does not occur.
The illusions that arise from
Various conditions are also various.
- 9.13 Nowhere is there
A single condition that is able [to give rise] to all.
If ultimate is nirvana and
Samsara is conventional, in that case,
- 9.14 Since even a buddha would be circling,
What use would bodhisattva conduct be?
If the conditions are not severed,
Also illusions are not averted.
- 9.15ab Since the conditions are severed,
There is no arising even conventionally.

OPINION: The lack of inherent existence contradicts the seeing by a direct perceiver of the five objects, forms and so forth.

RESPONSE: There is no contradiction. Forms and so forth, although established by a valid direct perceiver, have become valid with respect to mere conventionalities which are established by renown. It is not that the suchness of forms and so forth are established by that valid cognizer and have become valid with respect to it. {382} If that were the case, since even ordinary beings see suchness, it would [absurdly follow that] there is no need to generate superiors' paths. And you should understand that the *King of Meditative Stabilization Sutra* (*Samadhirajasutra*) refutes [the sense consciousnesses in the continuum of ordinary beings]¹⁸⁹ to be valid cognizers with respect to suchness, saying: "The eye, ear, and also nose are not valid..."

OBJECTION: If forms and so forth do not exist by way of their own character, why are they renowned? And if they are renowned, why are they false?

¹⁸⁹ Annotated in accordance with p. 596 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa's commentary.

RESPONSE: Things are false, just like the unclean female body and so forth that are renowned to be clean and so forth.

OBJECTION: If forms and so forth do not exist inherently, this contradicts the teaching in the sutras that they are impermanent and so forth.

RESPONSE: There is no contradiction. For the sake of engaging mundane beings in suchness gradually, the Protector taught that things are impermanent. In suchness things are not established as being momentary, because they are not established as being either one or many.

OBJECTION: This contradicts that the compounded are established as being impermanent even conventionally, because things of the morning existing in the evening and so on are renowned as being permanent in the world.

RESPONSE: Although forms and so forth are renowned as permanent in the world, there is not the fault that impermanence is not established by a valid cognizer, because impermanence and the like are established by the yogis' valid cognizer of conventionalities.

OBJECTION: This contradicts the explanation that the seeing of impermanence is the seeing of thusness. {383}

RESPONSE: There is no contradiction, because that [seeing of impermanence] is merely accepted as the seeing of thusness relative to the mundane beings' adherence to cleanliness, happiness, and permanence; otherwise, if all that is renowned in the world were to be valid, then it would [absurdly] follow that the yogis' meditation on ugliness that definitely understands women as unclean would be damaged by mundane beings who adhere to women as clean.

OBJECTION: If [phenomena] do not exist inherently, this contradicts the explanation that merit arises with respect to making offerings and the like to the victors.

RESPONSE: There is no contradiction; merit arises with respect to making offerings to illusory victors lacking true existence, just as you would assert that merit arises with respect to your assertion that the victors exist as true things. Merit arises in concordance with things – whether true or untrue.

QUALM: If sentient beings are illusory, lacking true existence, then, just like an illusion sentient being will not arise again after having disintegrated, having died, how are sentient beings reborn?

RESPONSE: We are not claiming that illusions and sentient beings are identical in every way; rather, we are asserting that they are alike in being truly existent or not truly existent. In case you attribute fault to merely that, then it is tantamount to you yourself saying: "Since dreams and illusions are asserted to be false, if the basis of [a magician's] emanation appears as a horse, why does it not appear as a donkey?" Therefore, also with respect to falsities, for as long as those conditions aggregate, for that long will illusions also arise. {384} Likewise, if the conditions for ignorance and the like aggregate, then minds will also join [to future rebirths].

OBJECTION: It is not similar, because sentient beings are of long continuity since beginningless time.

RESPONSE: Why should sentient beings be truly existent due merely to long continuity? It follows that the distinction of falsity due to illusions being of short continuity is untenable, because, in that case one would have to assert distinctions of truth and falsity since even illusions and dreams are of varying durations. For, one can recall an eon, a day, and so forth in dreams.

OBJECTION: If [phenomena] do not exist inherently and are illusory, this contradicts the explanation that killing sentient beings and the like gives rise to negativity.

RESPONSE: With respect to killing an illusion being and the like, if there is discrimination as a human being and penetration of the weapon and the like out of the desire to kill, then there is the negativity of the preparation, but no negativity of the actual [deed], because [an illusion being] has no mind. By benefiting and harming humans and so forth – sentient beings who possess illusion minds – merit and negativity respectively arise.

QUALM: Similar in being without inherent existence, why are there productions with and without minds?

RESPONSE: Because illusion substances, medicine, and mantras lack the ability to produce an illusion possessing mind, mind does not occur in illusion horses and elephants. The illusions that arise from various conditions **also** appear in varieties. The term “also” [in 9.12d indicates that illusions] are not limited to sentient beings. {385}

Various causes are necessary to give rise to various results, because nowhere is there a single condition that is able [to give rise] to all results. The Middle-Way proponents assert that ultimately there is no birth, aging, and so forth, that emptiness of inherent existence is natural nirvana, and that the birth, aging, and so forth established through the force of karma and afflictions are samsara.

SUTRA-SCHOOL PROPONENTS: If it is ultimate or natural¹⁹⁰ nirvana, it is nirvana. Samsara’s being empty of inherent existence is ultimate nirvana, but samsara is circling by way of the continuity of birth and death conventionally, whereby it [absurdly follows that] there is a common locus between samsara and nirvana. In that case, since even a buddha would be circling in samsara, what use would the bodhisattva conduct of the bodhisattvas for the sake of attaining buddhahood be? It [absurdly] follows that it is meaningless.

RESPONSE: There is no fault, because there is a difference between natural nirvana and the nirvana that is purity of adventitious [stains]. Natural nirvana does not rely upon familiarization on the path, because it is the dharmata of all regardless of the presence or absence of familiarization on the path. The nirvana that is a separation from adventitious stains must be attained from severing the circling in samsara by way of the continuity of birth and death. Hence, although lacking inherent existence, if the continuity of the conditions is not severed, not only samsara, but also illusions are not averted. {386} If the conditions such as ignorance are severed, then there is no samsara even conventionally.

One must respond to the debate above through differentiating between ultimate nirvana and nirvana, not with something else, because the opponent accepts that a buddha does not circle [in samsara] whereas sentient beings do.

3B2B-2B3D-1B1B-2B. Specific refutation of the assertions of the Mind-Only proponents¹⁹¹

9.15cd [Mind-Only proponent]: If even a mistaken [consciousness] does not exist,
Then what will observe the illusion?

9.16 [Middle-Way proponent]: If the illusion itself does not exist for you,
Then what is observed at that time?

[Mind-Only proponent]: If the other exists as those,
Those aspects are just mind.

¹⁹⁰ Gyi emended to read *gyis*.

¹⁹¹ Appeared previously as “Specific refutation of the Mind-Only proponents.”

- 9.17 [Middle-Way proponent]: If mind itself is an illusion,
Then what is seen by what at that time?
The Protector of the World also
Taught “Mind does not see mind.”
- 9.18 Just as the blade of a sword
Does not cut itself, the mind is similar.
[Mind-Only proponent]: It is just like a butter lamp
That perfectly illuminates the thing that is itself.
- 9.19 [Middle-Way proponent]: A butter lamp is not an object to be illuminated
Because it is not obscured by darkness.
[Mind-Only proponent]: There is blue, like glass, that relies on
Other for its blueness and that which does not.
- 9.20 Likewise, some [things] are seen in reliance
On other and [some] are even seen without reliance.
[Middle-Way proponent]: It is not the case that the blueness in that which was not
blue
Made itself into the nature by itself.
- 9.21 “A butter lamp illuminates.”
When it is said that consciousness knows,
Through being known by what
Is it said that “Awareness illuminates”?
- 9.22 If it is not seen by any,
Whether it illuminates or does not illuminate {387}
Is like the gracefulness of the daughter of a barren woman;
It is meaningless even to express it.
- 9.23 [Mind-Only proponent]: If a self-cognizer does not exist
How would a primary consciousness be remembered?
[Middle-Way proponent]: It is remembered through relation
When experiencing another, like the poison of a rat.
- 9.24 [Mind-Only proponent]: Because those possessing other conditions see it,
It is clear to itself.
[Middle-Way proponent]: Through applying the eye medicine of attainment
Vases are seen, but the eye medicine is not.
- 9.25 [Middle-Way proponent]: Seeing, hearing, and knowing
Are not what are refuted here.
Here that which is the cause of suffering –
The conception of them as truly existent – is that to be averted.

- 9.26 [Mind-Only proponent]: Illusions are not other than the mind;
Yet they are also not considered to be other.
[Middle-Way proponent]: If they are things, how could they not be other?
Stating “They are not other,” they would not exist as things.
- 9.27 Just as illusions are not truly existent but are objects of view,
Likewise [the consciousnesses] are viewers.
[Mind-Only proponent]: Cyclic existence has as its support things,
Other [than] that it would be like space.
- 9.28 [Middle-Way proponent]: If non-things depended on things,
Then how can they have functions?
Your mind would be alone
Without companions.
- 9.29 If the mind were free from apprehendeds,
At that time all would be tathagatas.
If so, what excellence would there be
In considering mere mind?

[Mind-Only proponent]: In case all phenomena lack inherent existence, if even a mistaken consciousness holding to an illusion does not exist, then what mind will observe the illusion? {388} Since there will not be any, even the illusion will not exist.

[Middle-Way proponent]: This is a dispute in which one thinks that if this even exists, then it must exist inherently. If the appearance of the apprehended object as an external object is established just as it appears for you, Mind-Only proponent, then since external objects exist, the illusory and the observer of it will not exist. If it is not established just as it appears, then since it lacks inherent existence, according to you it must be utterly non-existent. If even the illusion-like appearance as the apprehended object itself does not exist, then what apprehended object is observed at that time? Even apprehenders of forms, sounds, and so forth will not exist.

[Mind-Only proponent]: Even if the objects that are just as they appear – appearing as external objects – do not exist as those, that other than them exists; those aspects of forms and so forth are just of the substance of mind.

[Middle-Way proponent]: If mind itself appears as an illusory object but there is no external object, then what consciousness that is free of an object is seen by what valid cognizer at that time? There will be no seer. It is untenable that the consciousness itself experiences and cognizes itself in a manner of vanished dualistic appearances.

The Protector of the World also taught in the *Sutra Requested by Crown Jewel* (*Ratnachudapariṣiccha-sutra*) that “Mind does not see mind,” by positing analogies such as the blade of a sword cannot cut the blade of the sword itself. For example, just as the blade of a sword does not cut itself no matter how, similarly the mind does not see mind. {389} Since proponents of self-cognizers accept that an aspect of the apprehender cognizes itself, with respect to its object of cognition and the cognizer, there is not even a mere atom which dawns in dissimilar aspect, whereby they are asserted to be the same such that not even the isolates are different. Hence if such self-cognizers are asserted, then one must assert that the blade of a

sword cuts itself and the like, and one must assert that a valid cognizer comprehends its object of comprehension without relying on its object of comprehension.

The refutation of the analogy of the butter lamp is as follows:

[Mind-Only proponent]: For example, it is just like a butter lamp that perfectly illuminates the two – the thing that is itself and things that are other. Likewise, the consciousness cognizes both itself and other.

[Middle-Way proponent]: The analogy is not established. A butter lamp does not illuminate itself¹⁹², for a butter lamp is not an object to be illuminated by the butter lamp itself, because it does not need to and is not able to illuminate itself. In that case, if darkness also obscures both itself and other, then this is incorrect, because darkness is not obscured by darkness; if it is, then just like a vase that is obscured by a piece of cloth, darkness will not be seen.

The refutation of the analogy of glass is as follows:

[Mind-Only proponent]: There is blue, as in glass, which is produced through the force of the basis – white glass – relying on other, not by way of its own entitiness, and with respect to *vaidurya*, blueness is produced by way of its own entitiness, {390} not relying on others. Likewise, some such as forms are seen in reliance on other cognizers, that is, consciousnesses, and since consciousness cognizes itself by itself, [some] are even seen without reliance on other cognizers.

[Middle-Way proponent]: It follows that the analogy of the blueness of *vaidurya* not being produced as blue from other causes is incorrect, because it is not the case that the blueness in that which was not produced as blue from causes made itself into the nature of blue by itself.

Although a butter lamp does not illuminate itself, it is said that “A butter lamp illuminates.” When it is said that consciousness knows, it is not that consciousness illuminates itself. In that case, through being known by what consciousness of other substance is it said that “Awareness illuminates”? It is inappropriate. If it is known by another substance, then [it will absurdly follow that] there will be no contact. Thus, when [being illuminated] by itself is inappropriate and [being illuminated] by another is also inappropriate, if it is not known, that is, seen, even by any cognizer, then even to express the difference of whether it illuminates or does not illuminate is meaningless, because the basis of difference cannot be established by all, just like, when the daughter of a barren woman does not exist, it is meaningless to describe her gracefulness.

[Mind-Only proponent]: If a self-cognizer does not exist, how would a primary consciousness that is the object-possessor be remembered? Since it would not, if one were to be able to infer the experience through the sign of remembrance, at the time of remembering “I previously saw blue,” due to emphasis of the experience of remembrance, the experience of the object is established from the sign of remembering the object, “I saw blue”; that very experience of the object is the apprehender of blue. {391} The existence of the experience of the object-possessor is established from the sign of remembering the object-possessor, “I saw”; that is the self-cognizer. The self-cognizer is also established by the reasoning that refutes other alternatives as to what the experiencer of the apprehender of blue is.

[Middle-Way proponent]: Remembering the object-possessor does not establish the self-cognizer. When the apprehender of blue experiences another object, blue, the remembrance of the object-possessor will be generated in relation, that is, from the relationship between the

¹⁹² *Mar me rang gis mar me rang gis* emended to read *mar me rang gis rang* in accordance with p. 604 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

object and the object-possessor, “I previously saw this blue”, just like the poison of a rat not being experienced at the time of lethargy but remembered subsequently. For example, during winter, although the rat injected the rat poison into the body when in lethargy, the lethargy is experienced but not the poison.

The injection of the poison occurring simultaneously with the lethargy is analogous to the experience of the object-possessor existing simultaneously with the apprehended object.

The object-possessor not being experienced by itself at that time is analogous to the poison not being experienced at the time of the lethargy.

Remembering the lethargy subsequently is analogous to remembering the experience of the object.

Remembering the previous object-possessor, although it did not experience itself, through the very remembrance of the experience of the object {392} is analogous to remembering the previously injected poison that was not experienced through the very remembrance of the lethargy.

This appears to be a marvelous reasoning of the production of remembrance (in the absence of a self-cognizer) that is composed by the Lord of Scholars.

In response to “It follows that it is incorrect that in general a subsequent primary consciousness remembers, because that previous primary consciousness did not experience itself by itself” the reply is that the pervasion is not established. Hence the intention of *Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva* is taught to be “‘Self-cognizers are not refuted conventionally’ is utterly not the assertion of the great Victor’s Child.”

The refutation of another reasoning proving self-cognizers:

[Mind-Only proponent]: Because others – those possessing other conditions¹⁹³ such as having trained in pervasiveness though the practice of calm-abiding – see the mind and so forth, one’s own mind (which is very near) is clear as its own object, just as, for example, if one can see a faraway needle then one can see a nearby mountain.

[Middle-Way proponent]: Through applying the eye medicine where the eye medicine, a substance of attainment is anointed on the eye, treasures such as vases under the ground are seen, but the eye medicine itself is not. Likewise, the existence of the self-cognizer is damaged; the probans¹⁹⁴ is not appropriate.

Alternatively, not only does such an explanation not prove that the object to be illuminated and the illuminator are one (due to being similarly produced from the single cause of the illuminator), it follows that they are not definitely established as being one entity, {393} because at the time of seeing a vase under the ground due to application in which an eye medicine (which is established by secret mantra for seeing a great treasure vase under the ground) is anointed to the eyes, not only does it not [follow that] the object to be illuminated, the vase, is one with the illuminator, the eye medicine, it also does not [follow that] they are

¹⁹³ The following example is given on p. 607 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary. When one practices calm-abiding and attains an absorption of an actual concentration, in dependence on that, one trains by taking to mind the pervasiveness of a clairvoyance that knows the minds of others: “My mind is like this and my body is like that; also others’ mind is like this and their body is like that.”

¹⁹⁴ This, in Tibetan, is *sgrub byed*, that which acts to prove the probandum (that which is to be proved, *sgrub bya*). For example, in the statement “Sound is impermanent because of being a product,” the probans is “Being a product” and the probandum is “Sound is impermanent.”

of one entity. Hence, not only is it inappropriate as the probans of the self-cognizer, it also damages the existence of the self-cognizer.

[Mind-Only proponent]: However if there is no self-cognizer, then since there is no memory, there will be no experiencing of objects, seeing, hearing, and the like.

[Middle-Way proponent]: Conventionalities – seeing by the eye consciousness, hearing by the ear consciousness, and knowing by the mental [consciousness] – are not what are refuted here, because there is no need to refute them, since just these do not produce suffering and even foe-destroyers have them conventionally. Further, they cannot be refuted, because if they must be refuted through scripture and reasoning in refutation, scripture and reasoning are similar [to them in being objects to be refuted since they are also mere appearances]¹⁹⁵ in refutation. There will be a fault if they are refuted, because one will become a holder of the view of annihilation. Thus here that which is the cause of suffering – the conception of these objects as truly existent – is that to be averted, because that itself is the root of cyclic existence. For, Yongdzin Tamje Khyenpa says:

Therefore this innate apprehension of I apprehends the I as being established from the object's own side. That very object of the mode of apprehension of this mind – the I being established from the object's own side – is the final object of refutation here. Further, there are three modes of apprehension of the mind: {394} apprehension of I as really established, apprehension of a I lacking true existence, and apprehension of a mere I without making a distinction through either of the two [modes above].

With respect to those, the apprehension as a mere I is not the apprehension of the I, and not all appearances thinking “I” in the mind are to be refuted. If you were to hold that all minds thinking “I” are apprehensions of the I and refute them, then you will annihilate the support of actions and their effects. Hence, it is important to make hair-splitting distinctions of the mind.

And Gyeltshab Rinpoche says: “The statement ‘Mere appearances to the sense consciousnesses, such as the keeping of silence are not to be refuted; the apprehensions of them as either permanent or impermanent, existent or non-existent, and the like are to be refuted’ is a later saying of Chinese abbots.”

Therefore if the root of cyclic existence is not countered, cyclic existence will not be averted. Since the apprehenders of forms, sounds, and so forth as truly existent have been taught to be the root of cyclic existence, it is clearly asserted that hearers and solitary realizers have the realization of the selflessness of phenomena.

Mind-Only proponent: Since there are no external objects, illusions, that is, forms and so forth are not other substance than the mind; yet, since previously there was the criticism, “By what is it seen?” these two [i.e., mind and forms and so forth] are also not considered¹⁹⁶ to be other.

[Middle-Way proponent]: If forms and so forth are truly existent, then they must be true in just the way they appear. In that case, since they appear as external objects, they must be

¹⁹⁵ Annotated in accordance with p. 608 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa's commentary.

¹⁹⁶ Spelt as *bntag* on p. 607 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa's commentary.

established as external objects. But if they are external things, how could they not be other substance than the mind? It follows that they are other substance [than the mind]. Stating “They are not other substance,” it follows that they would not exist as truly existent things, {395} because, asserting appearances as false, they are not other than it [mind].

Just as illusions – forms and so forth which appear as objects – are not truly existent but are objects of observation that are objects of view of the mind, likewise the six consciousnesses are similar in not being truly existent although they are viewers. Hence, the Middle-Way proponents do not incur the previously stated fault “If even a mistaken [consciousness] does not exist” [in 9.15]. If you, the Mind-Only proponents were to also rely on that mode, it would be wonderful.

[Mind-Only proponent]: Falsities and imputed existents, such as cyclic existence and the like, have as their support or have as their basis some truly existent thing, because all mistakes have some truly existent basis. For example, even though a log may be mistaken as a human being, the log is established as true. Similarly, if cyclic existence does not depend on anything other than depending on the basis of truth, then it would lack things, like space.

[Middle-Way proponent]: The meaning of this argument has been taught in [Shantideva’s] *Compendium of Trainings (Sikṣasamuccaya)*; explanations elsewhere are not its meaning.

[Middle-Way proponent]: If falsities, non-things such as cyclic existence, depended on things that are truly existent mistaken bases, then how will they have functions of producing effects such as bondage and freedom? It follows that they will not, because the bases that are depended upon, truly existent things, do not exist. This reason is taught in [Shantideva’s] *Compendium of Trainings (Sikṣasamuccaya)*.

By way of your system, Mind-Only proponents, {396} it follows that mind would be alone, self-cognizing and self-illuminating without companions such as mistaking the apprehendeds and apprehenders as dual. For, since you assert that this appearance of the object and the object-possessor as being faraway and cut-off is not established as it appears, external objects do not exist, and since the appearances of forms and so forth being consciousnesses has been refuted above, they are not consciousnesses. In this case, since they would be other objects unrelated to consciousness, although the appearances of forms and so forth would be corrupted, the substance of consciousness would be uncorrupted. If you assert this, then it follows that the mind would be free from the appearances of dual apprehendeds and apprehenders, at that time all sentient beings would be tathagatas and be freed effortlessly, because all sentient beings would be free from the appearances of dual apprehendeds and apprehenders.

If asserted so, what excellence, that is, purpose would there be in considering, that is, determining mere mind in which apprehendeds and apprehenders are empty of being different substances for the sake of attaining omniscience? It follows that there is not the slightest [purpose], because of that assertion.

3B2B-2B3D-1B1B-2C. Dispelling the consequence that the Middle-Way proponents lack the need and ability for a mind (path) that realizes emptiness

9.30 [Mind-Only proponents and so forth]¹⁹⁷: Even if one knows them to be like illusions,
How will the afflictions be averted?

¹⁹⁷ Annotated in accordance with p. 611 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

Even the very creator of an illusion woman
Will produce attachment.

- 9.31 [Middle-Way proponents]: That creator has not abandoned
the latencies of the afflictions
With respect to objects of knowledge.
Therefore when he sees it
His latencies of emptiness are weak.
- 9.32 Through cultivating the latencies of emptiness {397}
The latencies of things will be abandoned, and
Through familiarizing with “Nothing whatsoever exists,”
Later on that too will be abandoned.
- 9.33 When it is said “Nothing exists,”
The thing that is investigated is not observed.
At that time, how does a non-thing separated from the support
Abide in front of the mind?
- 9.34 When neither thing nor non-thing
Abides in front of the mind,
Since there is no other aspect at that time,
In the absence of objects of observation, [elaborations] are utterly pacified.
- 9.35 Just as wish-fulfilling jewels and wish-granting trees
Completely fulfill hopes,
Likewise through the force of their prayers for those to be subdued,
The exalted bodies of victors appear.
- 9.36 For example, having accomplished
The Garuda Shrine, he passed away.
Yet, even though he passed away a long time ago,
It still pacifies poisons and the like.
- 9.37 Likewise, the shrine of a victor is also accomplished
In accordance with the enlightened conduct, and,
Although the bodhisattva has attained nirvana,
He enacts all welfares.
- 9.38 [Hearers’ school:] How will results come to be possessed
By making offerings to one without mind?
[Middle-Way proponent:] Because it is has been explained that
Abiding and having attained nirvana are similar.
- 9.39 Either conventionally or in thusness it is suitable;
That there is a result is found in the scriptures.

For example, it is just like how there is a result
With respect to truly existent buddhas.

[Mind-Only proponents and so forth]: Even if you have determined that all phenomena lack inherent existence like illusions, and know thus, {398} in the absence of a purpose such as the abandonment of afflictive obscurations by it, having determined such is nothing but fatigue. Even if you were to assert that there is a purpose, how will the afflictions be averted by it? It follows that that they will not [be averted by it], because even the very magician, the creator of an illusion woman, although realizing the emptiness of an external woman, thinking, “What if this illusion woman could be enjoyed?” it is seen that the magician will produce attachment. Besides the mere realization of emptiness by¹⁹⁸ you through initial hearing and contemplation, there is nothing.

[Middle-Way proponents]: That magician, the creator of the illusion, has not abandoned even slightly the latencies of the afflictions, the apprehension of true existence with respect to the object of knowledge, that is, to the illusion woman, and apprehends it as truly existent. Therefore when he sees it his latencies of realization of emptiness are weak, whereby afflictions are produced.

It is incorrect to reply saying, “The realization by the previous ones that the illusion woman is empty of being a woman does not abandon afflictions since [that emptiness] is merely a trifling emptiness. They are abandoned by the realization of emptiness which pervades our [Middle-Way] system,” because the realization that the illusion woman is empty of being a woman is not a trifling realization of emptiness that relies on the subtle object of refutation [since that realization must realize the illusion woman as lacking true existence]¹⁹⁹; from explanations elsewhere you should understand: (1) the identification of the object of refutation, (2) that if one realizes the absence upon one phenomenon, then understanding comes with respect to other [phenomena], and so forth.

Hence, in general, with respect to mistakes, as in the case of the seeing of falling hairs due to cataracts, a non-conceptual mistake, {399} that mistake will not be averted through the mental [consciousness] understanding that there are no falling hairs; in order to avert that, one must try to eliminate the cataracts of the eyes. Also, with respect to conceptual mistakes, mistakes that arise from temporary incidental causes are averted by merely realizing, for example, that the striped rope that has been apprehended as a snake is a rope; in order to avert that, prolonged familiarization with that understanding and the like are not necessary. The apprehension of true existence in the continua of all migrating beings has been greatly habituated with in their continua since time without a beginning which cannot be perceived even by the buddhas. It is as though it has thoroughly cooked the continuum. Therefore, let alone its seeds, how can even the manifest coarse [apprehension of true existence] be averted by the mere realization of lack of true existence? Not only just that, even though the direct realization of the lack of true existence abandons the acquired afflictions along with their seeds, it does not abandon the innate afflictions. For this reason, the presentation of paths such as the path of meditation which is to be familiarized for a long time has been frequently taught. It has been asserted that the realization of emptiness will extinguish afflictions eventually, and that is sufficient; it has not been and is not being

¹⁹⁸ Kyi emended to read *kyis* in accordance with p. 611 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

¹⁹⁹ Annotated in accordance with p. 612 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

asserted that “It is necessary for the realization of emptiness to abandon them immediately.” The condensed reply is “How can that be necessary?”

That magician who created the illusion woman has not abandoned the latencies of the afflictions, the apprehension of true existence of the object of knowledge that is the observed object, the illusion woman, and apprehends it as truly existent. Therefore when he sees that the illusion woman is empty of being a woman, those latencies of emptiness are weak and lack the ability to harm the apprehension of true existence, {400} because they do not contradict its mode of apprehension. “Latencies” in “latencies of the afflictions” can refer to the apprehension of true existence, and can refer to its seeds and knowledge obscurations. However here it is taken to be the former.

If one cultivates the latencies of emptiness and realizes things to be empty of inherent existence, the latencies of apprehending things as truly existent will be abandoned, and through familiarizing with “Nothing whatsoever exists,” that is, the realization of lack of true existence, later on the apprehension of the lack of true existence as truly existent too will be abandoned. If merely the coarse object of refutation is refuted, then true existence must be refuted later on. However, a refutation in which the subtle object of refutation (which is existence not merely posited by convention of name taken as the measure of true existence) has been refuted refutes the apprehension of true existence from that very time, and it will immediately be severed.

When it is said “No thing exists truly,” if the thing that is investigated truly exists, then it is suitable to be observed, but it is not observed to truly exist. Hence at that time of realizing that it does not exist truly, a truly existent non-thing is refuted because its support that is the property-possessor is separated from true existence; how does the truly existent abide in front of the mind?

Since there is no property that is separated from a property-possessor, if the emptiness of true existence is truly existent, then the property-possessor must be established in the nature of [the property]. Since its [the property-possessor’s] being established in the nature of true existence has been refuted earlier on, when neither a truly existent thing nor non-thing abides in front of the mind, since there is no other truly existent aspect at that time {401} and all focal points that are the objects of observation of the effect apprehension of true existence are absent, all elaborations are utterly pacified. For, in the perspective of a person who directly realizes emptiness, even dualistic elaborations regarding emptiness are pacified, but for a realization by way of a meaning-generality, even though dualistic appearances have not been stopped, in its perspective, the elaborations of true existence have been stopped. This stanza and the following five stanzas [9.34-9.39] extensively reveal the mode of abidance of the effect. According to the To-lung Gya-mar²⁰⁰, having taken ‘the non-existence of knower consciousness and the non-existence of objects of knowledge at the time when the mode of abidance is manifest’ to be assertions of this treatise [Shantideva’s *Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva*] and of the Abbot Den-nyi, they claimed that ‘the knower consciousness of no objects of knowledge and the valid cognizer of no objects of comprehension are ignorance.’ It is obvious from their assertions of the emptiness of true existence as being truly existent that they have not understood even slightly the assertion of the great trail-blazers. Even as they have come under the influence of the view of permanence, they pride themselves in having realized the meaning of the Middle-Way. This is seriously inappropriate.

²⁰⁰ The expression literally refers to the Chinese communists of the region Tolung near Lhasa.

OBJECTION: If the buddhas have pacified all conceptions, then, since they also do not think “I shall reveal the Dharma to those to be subdued,” it is untenable for them to enact the deeds of revealing the Dharma to sentient beings.

RESPONSE: There is no fault. Even they do not have conceptions, just as making supplications to wish-fulfilling jewels and wish-granting trees completely fulfills hopes as desired, {402} likewise through (1) the strength of those to be subdued having collected the merit to meet the buddhas and the like, and, (2) the force of previous prayers for those to be subdued, “May I enact the welfare of sentient beings effortlessly and spontaneously” (even though the buddhas do not conceptualize), the exalted form bodies of the victors appear and reveal the Dharma. This is very much tenable.

OBJECTION: Since a long time has passed since the prayers have been made, their production of effects is not tenable. And since the prayers were made by bodhisattvas, it is not feasible for their effects to be deeds of victors.

RESPONSE: There is no fault. For example, having accomplished the Garuda Shrine for pacifying poisons, the brahmin passed away. Yet, even though he passed away²⁰¹ a long time ago, the Garuda Shrine still is able to pacify poisons and the like now. Likewise, the shrine of a victor is also accomplished by way of the two accumulations in accordance with the enlightened conduct by the bodhisattva, and, although the bodhisattva has attained non-abiding nirvana, unsurpassable manifest [enlightenment], there is no contradiction that he enacts all temporal and final welfares of those to be subdued. This is an argument that fails to understand the positing of continuity.

Hearers’ school: How will results of merit come to be possessed by making offerings to buddhas without a conceptual mind? For, there is no conception of accepting the offerings.

[Middle-Way proponent:] Even though buddhas do not have conceptions, it follows that it has been explained that merit will arise through making offerings, {403} because it has been explained in the *Sutra Requested by Maitri Simhanada* that the two – making offerings to the Buddha when his exalted body is actually abiding and to the relics after he has attained nirvana – are similar in merit.

It has been taught also in the [*Sutra of*]²⁰² *the Benefits of Circumambulating a Stupa*:

*Making offerings to one abiding and
An equally faithful mind towards
The relics of one who has attained nirvana
Do not differ in merit.*

Either conventionally or in thusness it is suitable to make offerings to buddhas and the like; that a result will arise from making offerings to them is taught in the scriptures by the buddhas. For example, it is just like how you have asserted that there is a result with respect to truly existent buddhas.

The meaning is as follows: Paying no heed to analyzing the meaning of suchness for the time being, it is sufficient for me that results arise in accordance with things, be they real or false.

²⁰¹ Dis emended to read ‘das.

²⁰² Annotated in accordance with p. 616 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

3B2B-2B3D-1B2. Establishing that even those who desire to attain mere liberation need to realize emptiness

3B2B-2B3D-1B2A. Argument

3B2B-2B3D-1B2B. Response

3B2B-2B3D-1B2A. Argument

9.40ab [Hearers' school:] By²⁰³ seeing the truths, one will be freed;
What is the use of seeing emptiness?

Hearers' school: By familiarizing with the direct seeing of the aspects of the Four [Noble] Truths, such as impermanence, one will attain freedom, the result of foe-destroyer; what is the use of seeing the emptiness of true existence of all phenomena? {404} It is purposeless and inappropriate.

According to the hearers' school:

- not only is the realization of emptiness not necessary for the attainment of buddhahood, even the mere name "selflessness of phenomena" is not accepted, and
- the mahayana sutra sets are not accepted as the words of the Buddha.

These are their main contentions. As an ancillary topic, we also refute the assertion that, even though the mahayana sutra sets are accepted to be valid, the realization of the selflessness of phenomena is not necessary for the attainment of the result of foe-destroyer. Asserting the proof that the very wisdom realizing emptiness is the path that liberates from [cyclic] existence, we state these passages.

3B2B-2B3D-1B2B. Response

3B2B-2B3D-1B2B-1. Establishing that the wisdom realizing emptiness is the path that liberates from cyclic existence

3B2B-2B3D-1B2B-2. Establishing [that the wisdom realizing emptiness] is the path for attaining non-abiding nirvana

3B2B-2B3D-1B2B-3. Advice that it is hence appropriate for those seeking liberation to meditate on emptiness

3B2B-2B3D-1B2B-1. Establishing that the wisdom realizing emptiness is the path that liberates from cyclic existence

9.40cd [Middle-Way proponent:] It is because in the scriptures it is taught that
Without this path there is no enlightenment.

9.41 [Middle-Way proponent:] If the Mahayana is not established,
How are your own scriptures established?
[Great-Exposition proponent:] Because these are established for both of us.
[Middle-Way proponent:] Initially they were not established for you.

9.42 Your conviction in them due to conditions
Is also identical for the Mahayana.
If something were true due to being accepted by two others,
Then the Vedas and the rest would also be true.

9.43 [Great-Exposition proponent:] Because the Mahayana is disputable.
[Middle-Way proponent:] Because there is dispute with the Tirthikas regarding the
scriptures and

²⁰³ *Ba'i* emended to read *pas*.

Also between you and others regarding other scriptures,
You should discard them. {405}

- 9.44 While the root of the teachings is fully-ordained monks,
Even those fully-ordained monks themselves abide with difficulty.
Those whose minds are together with observed objects
Abide in nirvana also with difficulty.
- 9.45 [Great-Exposition proponent:] The afflictions are abandoned, whereby they
are freed.
[Middle-Way proponent: It follows that] as soon as that happens they become [foe-
destroyers].
Although lacking afflictions,
The potencies of actions are seen in them.
- 9.46 [Great-Exposition proponent:] It is definitely said that
“There is no temporariness and craving for appropriation.”
[Middle-Way proponent:] That craving, although unafflicted,
Is still thorough obscuration. Why would there not be it?
- 9.47 Due to the condition of feeling, there is craving.
Feelings also exist in them.
A mind that is together with observation
Abides in some.
- 9.48 Having ceased [in] a mind that is separated from emptiness,
[They] will be produced once again,
As in the case of the absorption without discrimination.
Therefore, one should meditate on emptiness.
- 9.49 If any speech engaging the sutra sets
Is asserted to be the speech of the Buddha,
Why do you not assert that regarding most of the Mahayana
Since they are similar to your sutras?
- 9.50 If due to not being realized,
All become faulty,
Why, due to one sutra being similar,
Were not all spoken by the Victor?
- 9.51 Mahakashyapa and the others
Did not manage to fathom that speech.
Who would consider they as not to be held
Due to your not realizing it?

[Middle-Way proponent:] It follows that the realization of emptiness is definitely necessary even for the attainment of the result of hearer foe-destroyer, {406} because in the *Perfection of Wisdom Sutras (Prajnaparamita Sutras)* scriptures it is taught that without cultivating this path that realizes emptiness there is no attainment of the three enlightenments²⁰⁴. It is taught in the *Mother Sutras*,²⁰⁵ just as it has been cited in the *Great Commentary to [Shantideva's] Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva*, that there is no liberation for those having discrimination of things, and [the states of] perfect complete buddhas, and [the states] ranging from stream-enterers to solitary-realizers of all three times are attained in dependence on this very perfection of wisdom; it is not the meaning of the passage that only unsurpassable enlightenment is being referred to.

Furthermore, not all of the countless passages from the class of sutra indicating that hearers have the realization of the selflessness of phenomena have been cited.

These two lines of the text [9.40cd] state this probans having accepted that the mahayana is established to be the words of the Buddha in the mental perspective of someone from the hearers' school.

QUALM: If they do not assert that the mahayana scriptures are valid, will it not be illogical to state that as the probans?

RESPONSE: There is no fault, because it is not necessary for the three modes of all stated probans to be established by the opponent right from the beginning. Here the pervasion of this probans will also be established by genuine parallel reasoning below. Acharya [Shantideva] also posited the refutation of the wrong conception that refuses to accept that the mahayana sutra sets are the words of the Buddha and then stated these [following] passages. He proved the probandum²⁰⁶ of this reason, that the wisdom realizing emptiness is the paths of all three enlightenments; {407} although the mahayana is not established to be the words of the Buddha by means of establishing its pervasion, with respect to establishing by scripture that the mahayana is the words of the Buddha, there is no misdeed in its application.

OBJECTION: The mahayana sutra sets are not established to be the words of the Buddha for me and I do not accept them to be valid. Hence, when establishing the path, proving that the realization of emptiness is also the path of the hearers through stating that as the probans is a case of the probans being identical to the probandum.

[Hearers' school:] If asked, "How are your scriptures – these Hinayana sutra sets that you assert to be valid – established to be the words of the Buddha?" then [I say that] they are words of the Buddha because these Hinayana sutra sets are established to be the words of the Buddha for both of us.

[Middle-Way proponent:] The reasons are identical. For, initially when you were just born and had not determined them through scriptures, meaning, and reasoning, these Hinayana sutra sets were also not established as valid for you. Later, due to conditions for asserting the scriptures as valid, methods for determining them through scriptures, meaning, and reasoning – methods such as teachings on the greatness of engagement in (1) illuminating the vinaya, (2) engaging the sutra sets, and (3) not contradicting the abhidharma – then you developed the

²⁰⁴ These are the enlightenment of the hearers, the enlightenment of the solitary-realizers and the enlightenment of buddhahood.

²⁰⁵ These refer to the *Perfection of Wisdom Sutras*.

²⁰⁶ This, in Tibetan, is *sgrub bya*, that which is to be proved.

conviction in these valid scriptures. The probans that established such is identical also for the mahayana sutra sets.

Otherwise, if something were true as valid due to being accepted by any two other persons, then it follows that the Vedas texts and the rest would also be true, {408} because they are accepted as valid by two persons.

[Great-Exposition proponent:] Since the Hinayana sutra sets accepted by me are also accepted by you to be the words of the Buddha, there is no dispute. However, since I do not accept the mahayana sutra sets, they are disputable.

[Middle-Way proponent:] (1) Because there is dispute between the Tirthikas and the hearers' schools regarding the Hinayana scriptures, and (2) because, although all eighteen sub-schools assert the Hinayana scriptures as valid, regarding other internal divisions of the scriptures, such as the teachings on the existence of the intermediate state²⁰⁷ existence, since some in the Hearers' school accept them as words of the Buddha while some do not accept them, there is also dispute within the Hearers' school, between you and others, it follows that you should discard even the Hinayana sutra sets as being valid.

The foe-destroyers, having heard [teachings] from the Buddha directly, condensed them in scriptures which were subsequently taught. Thus from among the many fully-ordained monks explained [such as nominal fully-ordained monks]²⁰⁸, the root of the teachings of the Buddha Bhagavan is the foe-destroyer fully-ordained monks. While that is so, **even** foe-destroyer fully-ordained monks themselves abide with difficulty:

The subject –hearer superiors – it follows that they do not attain the state of foe-destroyer, because they do not take the wisdom realizing emptiness as the path.

This also indicates the flinging of the consequence that the state of foe-destroyer is not possible for those who do not accept the emptiness that is the phenomena's emptiness of inherent existence. The term “even” [in 9.44b signifies] “not only will they not attain buddhahood if they are separated from the realization of emptiness, [they will also not attain the mere state of foe-destroyer]²⁰⁹.” {409}

The subject – hearer foe-destroyers – it follows that they abide in nirvana also with difficulty, that is, even the nirvana of their continua is untenable, because their minds are together with observed objects of the apprehension of true existence, that is, their minds adhere to things as truly existent without repudiating the adhered objects of [the apprehension of true existence]. Alternatively, by taking the first two lines [of 9.44] to be the thesis, the later two lines refer to the sign, explaining that “As long as one has the apprehension of true existence, one will not attain nirvana.”

[Hearers' school:] The realization of emptiness is not necessary for the attainment of [the state of] foe-destroyer. Instead, by cultivating the path that realizes the sixteen [attributes of the Four Noble Truths] such as impermanence, the afflictions are abandoned exhaustively, whereby they are freed and attain the result of foe-destroyer.

[Middle-Way proponent:] It follows that as soon as the manifest afflictions have been abandoned by persons who abandon merely the manifest afflictions for the time being, they

²⁰⁷ *Bor* emended to read *bar* in accordance with p. 619 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa's commentary.

²⁰⁸ Annotated in accordance with p. 620 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa's commentary. “Nominal fully-ordained monks” seems to refer to those who are involved with impure rites of vows or impure motivations.

²⁰⁹ Annotated in accordance with p. 620 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa's commentary.

become foe-destroyers, because having exhausted the afflictions by cultivating the path of the sixteen [attributes of the Four Noble Truths] such as impermanence, [the state of] foe-destroyer is attained. Those two are taken to be similar in every way. That cannot be asserted, because although lacking manifest afflictions temporarily, the potencies of actions that connect to future rebirths are seen in those persons who have abandoned merely the manifest afflictions.

“The afflictions are abandoned, whereby they are freed” [9.45a] expresses the system of the previous side. In accordance with the explanation that “By seeing the truths, one will be freed,” [9.40a] it is to be explained that {410} “When by cultivating the path of the sixteen [attributes of the Four Noble Truths] such as impermanence, afflictions are abandoned and freedom will be attained.” For, in this context this is an argument regarding whether or not freedom from afflictions will be attained by way of merely the path of the sixteen [attributes of the Four Noble Truths], and this is very clear from the argument “By seeing the truths” and so forth.

Therefore, the explanation that “Having asserted that the path of the sixteen [attributes of the Four Noble Truths] such as impermanence is able to exhaust afflictions, it is not that one will be freed from all suffering by it” is utterly not its meaning. Hence if it is posited that one attains the freedom that is the exhaustion of afflictions by the path at the time of the temporary absence of the manifest fluctuation of that posited as afflictions common to the two hearers’ schools due to having generated in one’s continuum the path as explained earlier, then the following assertion must be refuted: “Due to merely the manifest afflictions having been abandoned temporarily, as soon as that happens, the freedom that is the exhaustion of all contaminations will be attained.”

This cannot be asserted, because “Although lacking afflictions, / The potencies of actions are seen in them” [9.45cd] indicates that “Although lacking manifest afflictions temporarily, the potency²¹⁰ to project future rebirths by the force of actions is seen.”

Also, Gyeltshab Rinpoche says:

These passages must be explained in this manner; it should not be taken as [asserted by] some commentaries and Tibetans: “On account of seeing the issuing forth of suffering, the result of actions that were accumulated at the time of being ordinary beings previously, in Maudgalyana, Arya Angulimala, and so forth, they did not become freed immediately.” {411} This is not the potency which will generate suffering of this life; rather, it indicates that “Since the ability to project future rebirths due to karma (actions) has not been overcome, they are not freed.”

[Great-Exposition proponent:] It is definitely said that “The abandonment in those who have attained the state of foe-destroyer is not just temporary; since craving, the cooperative condition for appropriating existence, has been exhaustively abandoned there are no seeds, whereby one does not take a future rebirth.”

[Middle-Way proponent:] Although this craving in the continuum of the person whom you asserted to be a foe-destroyer is unafflicted in the way it has been explained in the Abhidharma, it still is thorough obscuration according to the Abhidharma. Just as ignorance is asserted to be of two types, afflicted and unafflicted, why would there also not be a craving

²¹⁰ The Tibetan text says *mi* here, meaning “inability,” which may be a scribing error.

that is afflicted and one that is not, in the way it has been explained in the Abhidharma? This must be asserted.

This passage indicates that there is unafflicted craving in the way it is renowned in common for the two [hearers'] schools and the mahayana; you should understand that it is utterly not that the craving in our system are asserted to be of two types, afflicted and unafflicted.

Thus although one has temporarily abandoned the manifest craving that is induced by the apprehension of a self in which a person is apprehended as self-sufficient substantially-existent, why would there not be craving that is induced by the view of the transitory collection in which a person is apprehended as being established by way of its own entity? {412} This being the case, the abandonment of manifest afflictions explained earlier does not avert even the manifest view of the transitory collection and craving that have just been explained. If, when one has abandoned the manifest afflictions in both these systems, the seeds in both systems are alike in not being abandoned, and the difference in whether the manifest afflictions are present or absent does not occur, then it is meaningless to make distinctions with respect to craving.

Since those persons who have not realized emptiness do not abandon even slightly the ignorance that apprehends feelings as truly existent, due to the condition of feeling, there is definitely production of the craving not to be separated from happiness feelings and the craving that desires to be separated from suffering. For, the adherence to feelings as existing by way of their own character exists in those whom you assert to be foe-destroyers. A mind that is together with the observation of things as truly existent abides manifestly in the continua of some persons. As long as that is the case, it is impossible to avert even the manifest craving that is induced by it.

Although it is recognized that manifest afflictions can be ceased temporarily in a mind that is separated from the realization of persons and aggregates as being empty of being established by way of their own character, but they will be produced once again manifestly, as in the case of one abiding in the absorption without discrimination. Therefore, definitely assert that those who desire to attain not only omniscience but even the mere result of foe-destroyer should meditate on the emptiness that refutes the subtle object of negation.

(1) Taking hearers and solitary-realizers such as Tseg Wang-chug Seng-ge to lack the realization of selflessness of phenomena as the thought of [Shantideva's] *Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva*, and {413} (2) holding faults saying, "With respect to 'Due to the condition of feeling' [in 9.47a], inferring the result by way of the cause is indefinite pervasion" are cases of [opponents of] the previous side's dawn not yet breaking and talk that is unsuitable to be released in a gathering. The assertion that the apprehension of persons and aggregates as truly existent is an affliction is accepted also by this Acharya [Shantideva]. If you wish to understand this extensively, you should know it from the great explanation of [Chandrakirti's] *Supplement to the Middle Way (Madhyamakavatara)* composed by the Foremost Tamche Khyenpa [Tsongkhapa].

At the end of this passage are three stanzas, "If any speech..." [9.49–9.51], that are asserted to indicate the reasonings that prove that the mahayana is the words of the Buddha. But prior to "While the root of the teachings is fully-ordained monks..." [in 9.44a], there was material [proving that the mahayana is the words of the Buddha in 9.40ab–9.43]. The context of their inclusion [at a later point again] is not known and the Abbot explained in the great commentary that "[These three stanzas] are not the text of Acharya [Shantideva]."

In any case, their meaning is as follows. If any speech – (1) engaging the sutra sets (since the higher training in mind [meditative stabilization] is taught), (2) illuminating the vinaya (since the higher training in ethics is taught), and (3) not contradicting the Abhidharma (since the higher training in wisdom is taught) – is asserted to be the speech of the Buddha, why do you not assert that most of the Mahayana sutra sets are the words of the Buddha since they teach the three trainings?

If you assert that, due to one sutra not being realized as fulfilling the characteristics of being words of the Buddha posited by you, and all Mahayana sutra sets are faulty, {414} then why do you not assert that, due to seeing one Mahayana sutra that fulfills the characteristics of being words of the Buddha asserted by you, since it is similar in characteristics to what you assert as sutra sets, that all Mahayana sutra sets were spoken by the Victor?

OBJECTION: If the *Extensive Mother* [the *Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra*] and the like are the words [of the Buddha], then it would be reasonable that Mahakashyapa and the others understood their subject matter. But they did not. Hence they are not the words [of the Buddha].

RESPONSE: Who would consider them as not to be held as the words [of the Buddha] due to your taking as the reason that Mahakashyapa and the others did not realize the very profound which is asserted to be difficult to fathom? Such consideration is inappropriate.

3B2B-2B3D-1B2B-2. Establishing that the path realizing emptiness is [the path for attaining] non-abiding nirvana²¹¹

9.52 The accomplishment of dwelling in cyclic existence
 Free from the extremes of attachment and fear
 For the welfare of those suffering out of confusion
 Is the result of emptiness.

The achievement of non-abiding nirvana is definitely contingent upon the realization of emptiness. The arya bodhisattvas' accomplishment of dwelling in cyclic existence through the force of compassion, free from both the extremes of: (1) falling into the extreme of permanence of cyclic existence – circling through the force of karma and afflictions out of attachment to the aggregates as truly existent as in the case of ordinary beings – and (2) falling into the extreme of annihilation in which one acts to attain the nirvana that arises from severing merely rebirth in cyclic existence out of fear of the suffering of cyclic existence as in the case of hearer and solitary-realizers, for the welfare of suffering sentient beings who are circling in cyclic existence out of confusion regarding the person and the aggregates as truly existent {415} is the result of realizing emptiness. For, if one is separated from the realization of emptiness, then although one is already abiding in cyclic existence, when one experiences the suffering of cyclic existence as existing in and of itself²¹² and becomes disillusioned, one will fall into the extreme of annihilation.

3B2B-2B3D-1B2B-3. Advice that it is hence appropriate for those seeking liberation to meditate on emptiness

9.53 In that case, it is not correct to
 Repudiate the side of emptiness.

²¹¹ This outline appears previously as “3B2B-2B3D-1B2B-2. Establishing [that the wisdom realizing emptiness] is the path for attaining non-abiding nirvana.”

²¹² *Rang tshan pa* is translated as “existing in and of itself.”

Therefore, without entertaining any doubts,
One should meditate on emptiness.

- 9.54 The antidote to the darkness of the afflictive obscurations and
Obscurations to knowledge is emptiness.
Why do those who wish for omniscience quickly
Not meditate on it?
- 9.55 If terror will be generated from
The thing which produces suffering,
Then why generate fear with respect to
That which pacifies suffering – emptiness?
- 9.56 If some self existed,
Then one will fear anything whatsoever.
But since no such self exists
Who becomes afraid?

Therefore, in the case of what was earlier explained, it is not correct to repudiate the side of emptiness, because the reasoning that will be explained below will also damage that. Therefore, without entertaining any doubts, even those who wish to attain the enlightenment of the hearers and solitary-realizers should meditate on emptiness. For, the apprehension of true existence is the afflicted ignorance that is the root of cyclic existence, and without repudiating its adhered object, the attainment of liberation is impossible. {416}

The antidote to the darkness of the afflictive obscurations and obscurations to knowledge is the wisdom realizing emptiness. Hence why do those who wish for omniscience in which the two obscurations have been extinguished quickly not meditate on that emptiness? Separated from it, one will not be able to even abandon the seeds of the afflictive obscurations. The seeds of the obscurations to knowledge are the final imprints of afflictions, whereas manifest obscurations to knowledge are the factors of appearance in which things appear truly existent and so forth. However, it is inappropriate to take [the following stand]: whatever appears as truly existent is necessarily an obscuration to knowledge and so forth.

In summary:

OBJECTION: Due to terror for the meaning of emptiness, one should not meditate on it.

RESPONSE: If it is appropriate to generate fear and terror with respect to the principal producer of the suffering of cyclic existence – the apprehension of true existence, then why generate fear with respect to that which pacifies the suffering of cyclic existence – the wisdom realizing emptiness? This fear is inappropriate, because that [wisdom realizing emptiness] extinguishes fear.

If some inherently established self existed, then, due to adhering to it, it is reasonable that one will generate fear towards any object whatsoever. But since no such inherently established self exists even in the slightest, who is it who becomes afraid? Turn inwards with a mind that contemplates inherent existence and think about it! One will become freed from all fears by understanding selflessness.

3B2B-2B3D-1B3. Extensive explanation of the reasonings that prove emptiness {417}

3B2B-2B3D-1B3A. Extensive explanation of the reasonings that prove selflessness of persons

3B2B-2B3D-1B3B. Extensive explanation of the reasonings that prove selflessness of phenomena

3B2B-2B3D-1B3A. Extensive explanation of the reasonings that prove selflessness of persons

3B2B-2B3D-1B3A-1. Refuting the adhered object of the innate apprehension of the self of persons

3B2B-2B3D-1B3A-2. Refuting the adhered object of the acquired apprehension of the self of persons

3B2B-2B3D-1B3A-3. Dispelling objections regarding the refutation

3B2B-2B3D-1B3A-1. Refuting the adhered object of the innate apprehension of the self of persons

9.57 Teeth, hair, and nails are not the self.
 The self is not the bones or blood.
 The mucus is not it, nor is the phlegm,
 Neither is the lymph or pus.

9.58 The self is not the fat or sweat.
 The lungs and liver are also not the self,
 Nor are the other inner organs the self.
 The self is not the excrement or urine.

9.59 The flesh and skin are not the self.
 The warmth and winds are also not the self.
 The cavities are not the self. In all ways
 The six primary consciousnesses are also not the self.

With respect to this, the difference between the acquired and innate apprehension of the self is as follows. An awareness generated spontaneously (without relying on having engaged in the analysis of reasoning) that apprehends inherent existence and existence by way of its own character (regardless of whether one observes person or aggregates) which exists in all – those whose minds have been transformed by tenets and those who have not – is called “the innate apprehension of true existence.” The [conception] thinking, “True existence is tenable” and “It is truly existent” in reliance on having engaged in the analysis of reasoning, although also an apprehension of true existence, is the acquired.

Although the apprehension of the self of persons can be included within the innate apprehension of self-sufficient substantial existence, {418} the apprehension of the person and the aggregates as being like a master and his servants should be known as being solely the acquired. In the same vein, the apprehension of particles as partless and consciousness as partless is solely the acquired apprehension of a self of phenomena.

In brief, the two apprehensions of the self that are generated spontaneously without relying on the analysis of tenets are the innate, whereas apprehensions of the self other than them are the acquired. Although the adhered objects of the former are the main objects of refutation, understand that the refutation of the objects of refutation of the latter is a branch of the refutation of the former.

OBJECTION: If this refutation of the teeth, nails, and so forth not being the self is for the sake of becoming liberated from cyclic existence, then it is inappropriate that sentient beings have the apprehension of them as mine but do not have the apprehension [of them] as I.

RESPONSE: It has the same meaning as the teaching that form is not the self. Therefore the object of observation from the pair – the object of observation and the subjective aspect of the innate view of the transitory collection – is the mere I that is the support of cause and effect and the mere self-isolate of the mine. With respect to that, the view of the transitory

collection is the adherence to the I and the mine as being established by way of their own character. Therefore it is explained that “If they are established by way of their own character, then we must be able to prove either: (1) the collection of the aggregates, their continuity, a division of them, or a part of them discuss a basis for characterization of the I, or (2) an entity different from them to be a basis for characterization of the I, but they are not established as such.”

The refutation that a division of the aggregates is the basis for characterization of the self is as follows. {419} The teeth and nails are not the self. A basis for characterization of the self is not the bones or blood. The mucus is not it, nor is the phlegm, because they are but merely imputed as the self, nothing more. Neither the lymph or pus is a basis for characterization of the I. A basis for characterization of the self is not the fat or sweat; the reason is as before. The lungs and liver are also not a basis for characterization of the self; nor are the other inner organs such as the intestines the self; the self is not the excrement or urine, and the flesh and skin are not the self, because [the self] is merely imputed to them, nothing more. The warmth and winds are also not the self. The cavities and so forth within the body are not the self. Understand this; that is all.

To summarize their meaning, the Propounders of Things of our [Buddhist] schools hold that the aggregates are the basis for characterization of the person, while the Outsiders [non-Buddhists] assert a self that is an object other than the aggregates, with the person being like a master and the aggregates being like [his] servants.

These teachings here bear the same meaning as the refutation of the six constituents as being the person in [Nagarjuna’s] *Precious Garland (Rajaparikatharatnavali)* (stanza 1.80-1.81):

*A person²¹³ is not earth, not water,
Not fire, not wind, not space,
Not consciousness, and not all of them.
What person is there other than these?*

*Just as a person is not real
Due to being a composite of six constituents,
So each of the constituents also
Is not real due to being a composite.*

“The cavities are not” [in 9.59c] is a refutation of the space constituent as being the person. {420}

Therefore, it is inappropriate to hold even conventionally that the collection of the aggregates, their continuity, a division of them, or a part of them is a basis for characterization of the person. There is also no different entity other than them to be posited as the person. The person is merely imputed in dependence on them; that is all. For, Yongdzin Tamje Khyenpa also says:

If there exists an I that is established from its own side in just the way it is held by the innate apprehension of the I, then it either: (1) exists in terms of these two – my body and mind, or (2) exists apart from these two.

²¹³ *Skyes bu*

If it were to exist apart [from my body and mind], then after individually eliminating the two, the body and the mind, there must be something to be demonstrated, “The I is this.” Since there is no such thing to be demonstrated, we conclude that it does not exist apart [from my body and mind].

If it were to exist in terms of these two, the body and the mind, then it should either: (i) exist in terms of this body, or (ii) exist in terms of this mind. If it were to exist in terms of this body, then search for it: Are factors of the earth constituent, such as the teeth, nails, and the like of this body it [the I]? Are the water constituents, such as the blood, lymph, mucus, and the like the I? Is the fire constituent included within the warmth the I? Are factors of the winds of the body the I? Are factors of the space constituent, the cavities, the hollows, of the body the I? It is easy to understand that each of these is not the I. Since we do not find the I when searching each of the parts of the body, we conclude that such an I does not exist in terms of the parts of the body. {421}

Does it exist in terms of the mind? If we were to search each of the six primary consciousnesses, such as the eye primary consciousness to see whether or not it is the I, we will conclude that they are not the I.

Even though it does not exist in terms of either the body or the mind, perhaps it exists upon the mere collection? Since it cannot be found through searching each of them, it is certain that it also does not exist in terms of the collection. Since the collection of the two, body and mind, is the basis of imputation, that the basis of imputation is the imputed phenomena is taught to be untenable.

Therefore, the so-called “I” is nothing but a mere imputation by the mind, whereby we conclude: that as held by the innate apprehension of I does not exist.

Thus, analyzing whether the I and the two – body and mind – are established as one or different, it is explained that in the case that they are established as different, then there must be something that can be identified apart from the two, the body and mind. Furthermore, one must do so through contacting the object of refutation that appears and is adhered to as existing from its own side; in general such is not necessarily the case for those merely established as different in other circumstances. Although the two – product and the impermanent – are different, there is nothing that can be identified saying, “The impermanent is this” as being apart from product.

If they are truly existent different, then, since the mode of abidance and the mode of appearance must agree, just as they individually appear to the mind as being unrelated, in actuality they must also individually abide as being unrelated. In case the mode of abidance and the mode of appearance do not agree, then they are false. {422} With respect to those merely established as different conventionally, there is no need for the mode of abidance and the mode of appearance to agree.

It is very important to understand these points on all occasions of the view. If they are not understood in this way, then at the time of analyzing the view, one will destroy conventionalities and not know how to posit them, and at the time of positing them conventionally, nothing else other than some truly existent will come about. Hence it is very important to understand how to identify the object of refutation well and the subtle essential points of the reasoning to refute it.

OBJECTION: Well then, there will be nothing even in the slightest to posit as the person.

RESPONSE: Is it not sufficient to engage Devadatta and Dharmadatta²¹⁴ without analysis? If you assert that the basis engaging the convention “person” is a person that is established by way of its own character, then you will fall into the extremes of permanence and annihilation. Thus you should understand that not even a mere atom of that exists.

3B2B-2B3D-1B3A-2. Refuting the acquired self²¹⁵

3B2B-2B3D-1B3A-2A. Refuting the assertion of the self as knower by²¹⁶ the Samkhyas

3B2B-2B3D-1B3A-2B. Refuting the assertion of the self as matter by²¹⁷ the Vaisheshikas

3B2B-2B3D-1B3A-2A. Refuting the assertion of the self as knower by the Samkhyas

9.60 If a knower of sound were permanent,
Then at all times there would be the apprehension of sound.
If there is no object of knowing,
Then due to cognizing what is it said to be a “knower”?

9.61 If there is a knower without [an object of] knowing,
Then it follows that wood is also a knower.
Therefore, without a closely abiding object of knowledge,
It is definitely to be stated “There is no knower.”

9.62 “That very one knows form.”
At that time, why does he also not hear?
“Because there is no sound nearby.” {423}
Therefore, a knower of that also does not exist.

9.63 How can that which is the nature of
Apprehending sound apprehend form?
That a single one is considered to be
Father and son is not absolute.

9.64 Thus, the lightness, motility, and darkness
Are not a son, and also not a father.
That is not seen to be in the nature
Of possessing the apprehension of sound.

9.65 If that itself, like an actor, is seen by way of another mode,
Then it would not be permanent.

²¹⁴ JN: “in making offerings to the deities, performing generosity of the Dharma” changed to Devadatta and Dharmadatta” in accordance with Geshe Jampa Gyatso’s oral commentary.

²¹⁵ This outline appears previously as “3B2B-2B3D-1B3A-2. Refuting the adhered object of the acquired apprehension of the selflessness of persons.”

²¹⁶ Gyi emended to read *gyis* in accordance with p. 631 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

²¹⁷ Gyi emended to read *gyis*.

“That itself has other modes.”
The oneness is something that does not exist before.

9.66 “The other modes are not true.”
Tell us, what is its nature?
“The consciousness itself.” In that case,
It would follow that all persons are one.

9.67 Also that with mind and that without mind
Would become one because they are similar in existing.
When particularities are erroneous,
How can they have a similar support?

If a knower-cognizer person who utilizes sound and the like were a permanent thing, then at all times, regardless of whether or not there is sound, it follows that the knower-cognizer person would apprehend sound by taking it as the apprehended object, because it is a permanent which apprehends it by taking it as the apprehended object.

It follows that the assertion is inappropriate, because if there is no object of knowing, then due to cognizing what is it said to be a “knower,” an object-possessor of that object? Saying that is inappropriate.

OBJECTION: The reason is not established. Even though sound is not established, there is permanently a knower apprehending it.

RESPONSE: It follows that wood is also a knower, {424} because the assertion of a knower without an object of knowing is permissible.

Therefore, without a closely abiding object of knowledge such as sound, it is definitely to be stated “There is no knower.” Otherwise, since there is nothing that acts to posit a knower, one must assert that there is no time at which sound is not apprehended by a person.

OPINION: There is no fault that it will follow that there will be a knower without an object of knowing. At that time when there is no sound, that very permanent person knows form by taking it as the apprehended object.”

RESPONSE: The subject – the person – at that time of apprehending form by taking it as the apprehended object, why does he also not hear sound? It follows that he hears sound, because he is a permanent who utilizes just those five²¹⁸ without bias.

OPINION: At that time of knowing form, because there is no sound abiding nearby, he does not know sound. {423}

RESPONSE: If you assert that “There is no object sound; therefore, a knower, an object-possessor, of that sound also does not exist,” then the assertion of the person as necessarily permanent degenerates. Furthermore, how will that which is in the nature of a knower apprehending sound become a knower apprehending form? It follows that it will not, because the aspects of those two will contradict.

OPINION: Just as a single person is posited to be a father and a son relative to different objects of relation, when apprehending form, relative to manifestations and nature, even though there is no manifestation of sound, there is the nature of sound, because form and sound are of the same nature. At that time, the object-possessor of sound is posited.

²¹⁸ The five sense object are forms, sounds, odors, tastes and tactile objects.

RESPONSE: It follows that that those two are not similar in analogy and meaning. {425} For, a single person is imputed as a father and a son relative to different objects of relation, not established absolutely²¹⁹ [upon the objects]²²⁰; you assert that their natures are established ultimately.

Thus, you assert that the three – lightness (mental potency), motility (motion), and darkness – in equilibrium is the principal, the nature, and ultimate truth. The very nature of the occasion of son is not the son; the very nature of the occasion of father²²¹ is not the father²²². For, the Samkhyas assert the following:

*The supreme nature of the qualities*²²³
Do not proceed to the path of seeing.
What is the path of seeing?
Strongly accumulating the illusory.

The nature never proceeds to the path of seeing. The father, son, and so forth that are actually seen are false.

In that case, that very father becomes the son, and that very son becomes the father, because the natures of the two, father and son, are one.

Hence, since you assert that the natures of the father and son are one, even though [they are imputed so] relative to different objects of relation, the occasions are not posited individually.

Furthermore, the subject – that apprehender of form – is not in the nature of possessing the apprehender of sound, because, if it is, then it must be seen by a valid cognizer, but it is not seen.

If that apprehender of sound itself, like an actor who relinquishes his earlier dressing such as clothes and puts on a subsequent set, is seen by way of another mode, that is, another manifestation of apprehending form, then it follows that the knower-cognizer would not be a permanent thing, {426} because it relinquishes another mode and takes on another.

OBJECTION: That apprehender of form itself has a mode other than apprehending sound. Since it is of one nature with the apprehender of sound, there is no fault.

RESPONSE: The oneness of nature of that is something that does not exist before, because they abide solely as different individuals. Alternatively, it follows that it is inappropriate to assert the later mode itself to be the previous mode itself, because the later unique one did not exist before. The *Great Commentary* explains that "If that unique one itself at the time of producing another later one is that unique one itself, then one similar to it and something that did not exist before are mutually contradictory, because you assert them to be one."

OBJECTION: The appearance in other modes are not true in accordance with how they appear, thereby there is no fault.

RESPONSE: Tell us, what is true in the same nature of that knower itself? It follows that you have nothing to say, because you assert that the mode in which they appear is not true in accordance with how they appear.

²¹⁹ *Yang dag nyid du grub pa*

²²⁰ Annotated in accordance with p. 633 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa's commentary.

²²¹ *Pa* emended to read *pha* in accordance with p. 633 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa's commentary.

²²² *Pa* emended to read *pha* in accordance with p. 633 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa's commentary.

²²³ Line break in accordance with p. 633 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa's commentary.

OBJECTION: The knower-cognizer person is just established to be true.

RESPONSE: In that case, it follows that all persons of different continua are one, because you asserted that all persons are necessarily partless permanents. Also it follows that that with mind, the knower-cognizers, and that without mind, matter, [such as]²²⁴ the Principal would become one, because they are similar in necessarily existing as partless permanents. Alternatively, apply the answer “It is true in the nature of existence itself.” {427}

When dissimilar particularities of manifestations are false errors, what is their similar, that is, identical, support – the truly existent general-principal? It follows that it does not exist because manifestations are falsities.

3B2B-2B3D-1B3A-2B. Refuting the assertion of the self as matter by the Vaisheshikas

9.68 Also that lacking mind is not the self
 Because it is without mind, like a vase and so forth.
 “Nonetheless, because it possesses mind, it knows.”
 It follows that the unknowing disintegrates.

9.69 If the self does not change,
 Then what is the use of intention acting on the self?
 Thus, that which is unknowing and free from activity –
 Space – would also act as the self.

Although the Naiyayikas and Vaisheshikas assert that the self is matter lacking mind, that is not the self because it is without mind, like a vase and so forth.

OPINION: Nonetheless, although the self itself is matter, because it is possesses mind by way of establishing coming together and separation²²⁵ it is posited as knowing objects.

RESPONSE: It follows that the self existing truly in the nature of previously not knowing objects disintegrates, because it knows objects through the strength of other later conditions.

If you assert that the self does not change in the slightest, then what is the use of intention acting on the self and its coming to know objects? It follows that it will not [know objects], because you assert that the self is changeless. In brief, it is because you assert that the self is unknowing and free from activity in this way, {428} whereby space would also act as the self. Asserting such a self is purposeless, because it does not benefit in even the slightest way.

3B2B-2B3D-1B3A-3. Dispelling objections regarding the refutation

9.70 “If a self does not exist,
 A relationship between action and result would not be appropriate.
 Having done an action, one would disintegrate,
 Whereby whose action would it be?”

9.71 Since it is established for both of us
 That the basis of the action and of the result are different
 And that there is no self that does it then,

²²⁴ Annotated in accordance with p. 634 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

²²⁵ For more explanation on the Vaisheshika’s assertions, refer to page 155 of J. Hopkins’ *Maps of the Profound*, Snow Lion Publications, 2003.

Is it not meaningless to argue about this?

- 9.72 It is impossible to see
'That possessing the cause as well as the result.'
In dependence on being one continuum,
He taught 'The doer [and] the utilizer.'
- 9.73 The minds of the past and of the future
Are not the self because they do not exist.
If the mind that has been produced is the self,
Then when that disintegrates, there would no longer be a self.
- 9.74 For example, when the trunk of a banana tree
Is split into parts, there is nothing at all.
Likewise, when sought with thorough analysis,
The self is also not real.
- 9.75 "Well then, if sentient beings do not exist,
For whom is compassion [cultivated]?"
[They] are those who are imputed by confusion
Asserted for the sake of the result.
- 9.76 "If sentient beings do not exist, who [obtains] the results?"
That they are true, nonetheless, is asserted from confusion.
In order to totally pacify suffering,
One should not reject the confusion of results.
- 9.77 The pride that is the cause of suffering
Is confusion regarding the self, whereby it will increase [suffering].
"Apart from that, there is no turning away."
Meditation on selflessness is the best. {429}

OPINION: If all things are produced and cease instant by instant in the absence of a self that is the basis of all bondage and liberation, then, since a relationship between virtuous or non-virtuous actions and their results would not be appropriate, and, having done a virtuous or non-virtuous action, one would disintegrate in the second instant, whereby whose action would it be? For, at the time of experiencing the result, the doer of the action does not exist. According to us, the person exists permanently.

RESPONSE: Since it is established for both of us that the persons, the bases (1) at the time of doing the action, the cause, and (2) at the time of utilizing the result are different, and that there is no self, the doer of the action, at the time of experiencing the result, is it not meaningless for you to argue about this on this occasion of teaching the relationship between actions and their results? For, you also assert that (a) there is no experience of the result at the time of doing the action, the cause, and (b) there is no doer of the action at the time of experiencing [the result]. This is because, in case [my above argument] is faulty, then it is also

similar for you, and because this seeing of the so-called “result along with the experience” is impossible at the time of possessing, that is, accumulating,²²⁶ the cause.

QUALM: Well then, how is it in your system?

RESPONSE: In dependence on being a single continuity of the aggregates, he taught, that is, imputed, ‘The doer of the action and the utilizer of the result.’ The so-called ‘continuity’ is the appropriator, the whole, that has as its object of appropriation the three – the previous, middle, and later instants – that are the parts. {430} In brief, there is no one who can posit tenable concurrent cause and [its] effect: ‘Although doing the action, this person is also experiencing [its] result.’

The minds of the past and of the future are not the self because, since they [respectively] have disintegrated and have not been produced, they do not exist as the self.

If the mind that has been produced is the self now, then when that disintegrates in the second instant there would no longer be a self as you asserted. For example, when the trunk of a banana tree is split into parts, there is nothing at all that is established inherently. Likewise, when sought with thorough analysis as to whether or not it is established inherently through reasoning, the self is also not established to be real, because it is damaged by the reasoning proving selflessness which will be explained below.

QUALM: Well then, if sentient beings do not exist inherently at all, for whom is compassion cultivated? For, the observed object of compassion does not exist.

RESPONSE: It follows that there is no fault that the observed object of compassion is untenable if sentient beings do not exist inherently, because conventionally existing sentient beings asserted for the sake of attaining the result of liberation who are imputed by confusion are tenable as the observed object of compassion. Imputation by confusion, when [“confusion” is] taken to refer to the apprehension of the self of persons and of phenomena, is the imputation of sentient beings as truly existent by it. Hence, the existence as imputed by it is refuted, whereby sentient beings are not refuted. For, through refuting it, sentient beings are established in mere name as imputed existents. Alternatively, taking confusion to refer to mere ignorance, {431} it is said that “sentient beings imputed by it exist as the observed object of compassion.”

QUALM: If sentient beings do not exist, which person obtains the results of familiarizing with compassion? Cultivating compassion will have no result.

RESPONSE: It is true that those causes and results lack true existence; nonetheless, it is asserted that there is no contradiction with familiarizing with compassion from [mere imputation by]²²⁷ confusion with respect to phenomena conventionally.

In order to totally pacify the suffering of sentient beings, one should not reject the non-afflictive confusion on the occasion of subsequent attainment [for the sake of] oneself attaining the result of buddhahood; one is not able to reject it for the time being. Although one does not reject it, this branch of method for attaining omniscience, when applied to the confusion regarding the meaning of suchness, is confusion regarding true existence. It is nevertheless appropriate to apply also the teaching that the compassions that observe sentient beings and observe phenomena (in which one cultivates compassion by way of observing mere sentient beings without qualifying them as lacking true existence) becomes the cause of

²²⁶ *Sogs* emended to read *gsog* in accordance with p. 637 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

²²⁷ Annotated in accordance with p. 638 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

buddhahood. Besides that, it means that conventionalities such as the observation of mere sentient beings which is not a realization of thusness are not to be rejected.

OBJECTION: Well then, why was confusion along with its objects refuted earlier on?

RESPONSE: The pride that is the cause of suffering of cyclic existence, that is, afflicted ignorance, just as taught earlier on in the context of “[Pride] that is the cause of suffering” [in 9.77a] is confusion regarding the self, {432} whereby it will increase the suffering of cyclic existence. Hence it must be rejected. And since one is able to reject it, there is no contradiction.

OBJECTION: Apart from turning away such confusion, there is no turning away of the apprehension of true existence; one cannot do so, because even though it may be turned away once, it will arise again just like the aggregates of cyclic existence. Hence it will not be utterly extinguished.

RESPONSE: It is not that the apprehension of true existence cannot be turned away, because, being an erroneous engagement regarding the mode of abidance of things, it is very weak and inferior, and reliance upon meditation on selflessness is the best. Since it realizes the suchness of things unerroneously, it can eradicate the other [i.e., the apprehension of true existence] from the root.²²⁸

3B2B-2B3D-1B3B. Extensive explanation of the reasonings that prove the selflessness of phenomena

3B2B-2B3D-1B3B-1. Explaining the selflessness of phenomena by way of the four close placements of mindfulness

3B2B-2B3D-1B3B-2. Dispelling quarrels that the two truths are incorrect

3B2B-2B3D-1B3B-3. Stating the reason that proves selflessness

3B2B-2B3D-1B3B-1. Explaining the selflessness of phenomena by way of the four close placements of mindfulness

- 9.78 The body is not the feet or calves.
 The thighs and loins are also not the body.
 Neither are the abdomen and back the body.
 The chest and shoulders are not the body either.
 The ribs and hands are also not the body.
- 9.79 The armpits and upper arms are also not the body.
 Even the inner organs are not it.
 The head and neck are also not the body.
 With regard to them, what is the body?
- 9.80 If this body were to abide
 Partially in all of them,
 Although indeed the parts abide in the parts,
 In what does it itself abide? {433}
- 9.81 If the body in its entirety
 Were to abide in the hands and so forth,
 Then however many hands there are and so forth,

²²⁸ JN: “Since it realizes the suchness of things erroneously, the other [i.e., meditation on selflessness] is able to eradicate it from the root” changed to “Since it realizes the suchness of things unerroneously, it can eradicate the other [i.e., the apprehension of true existence] from the root.”

That many bodies would there be.

- 9.82 If the body does not exist outside and inside them,
How could the body exist in the hands and so forth?
If that different from the hands and so forth does not exist,
How could it exist?
- 9.83 Therefore, [although] the body does not exist, due to confusion
Regarding the arms and so forth, there will be a mind [thinking of] the body;
Like, due to the feature of it being arranged in that shape,
An awareness of a human being [is generated] with respect to a cairn.
- 9.84 As long as the conditions are assembled,
For that long the body will appear as though it were a person.
Likewise, as long as the hands and so forth exist,
For that long will a body appear there.
- 9.85 Similarly, because they are a collection of fingers,
Also what are the hands?
Because they too are a collection of segments,
By dividing the segments also into their parts,
- 9.86 The parts are also divided into particles;
Those particles are also divided into directional parts;
Because the directions too, divided, are free from parts;
Like space, therefore, particles also do not exist.
- 9.87 Hence, which discerning one
Would be attached to dream-like form?
When, like that, the body does not exist,
What are men? What are women?
- 9.88 If suffering exists in reality,
Why would it not damage intense joy?
If there is happiness, why do those tormented by sorrow and so on
Not find joy in the delicious and so forth?
- 9.89 “Because it is overwhelmed by the strong,
It is not experienced.”
How can that which is not
The nature of experience be feeling? {434}
- 9.90 “The suffering exists subtly.
Is not the gross²²⁹ [aspect] of it dispelled?

²²⁹ Rigs emended to read *rags*.

It is mere joy distinct from it.”
The subtle is also that.

- 9.91 “The conditions contradictory to it are produced,
Thereby suffering is not produced.”
Conceiving it to be feeling,
Is it not established as ‘strongly adhered to?’
- 9.92 Because of that, as an antidote,
This thorough analysis is to be meditated on.
The concentration that arises from the field
Of thorough investigation is the food of a yogi.
- 9.93 If there were a gap between the sense power and the object,
Where would they meet?
Also if there were no gap, being a unit
What would meet with what?
- 9.94 A subtle particle does not enter a subtle particle.
They are without an interval and equal.
They do not enter, do not mix, and
Those that do not mix do not meet.
- 9.95 How could it be right to say
‘Even though the partless meet?’
If you have seen that which meets
But yet is partless, demonstrate it.
- 9.96 It is not correct for there to be a meeting
With primary consciousness, which is without body.
Because even a collection is not a thing,
Just as was thoroughly analyzed before.
- 9.97 Thus, if contact does not exist,
From what do feelings arise?
For the sake of what is there this fatigue?
What is it that damages what?
- 9.98 When there is no one who feels and
Feelings also do not exist,
Having seen this situation,
Why do you not turn away from craving?
- 9.99 Even though they are seen or touched,
Due to a nature similar to a dream or illusion, {435}
Because they are generated simultaneously with the mind,

Feelings are not seen by it.

- 9.100 Also, due to being generated before or after them,
It remembers them but does not experience them.
They do not experience their own natures,
Nor are they experienced by others.
- 9.101 There is no one who feels,
Hence feelings are not reality.
Thus, due to this what damage is there
To this selfless collection?
- 9.102 The mentality does not abide in the powers,
Not in forms and so forth, nor amidst them.
A mind is not inside, outside there is none, and
Is also not found somewhere else.
- 9.103 It is not the body, it is not other,
It is not mixed with it, nor is it at all separate from it.
It is not in the slightest; therefore,
A sentient being is a natural nirvana.
- 9.104 If the consciousness existed before the object of knowing,
Through observing what would it be produced?
If the consciousness and the object of knowing are simultaneous,
Through observing what would it be produced?
- 9.105 Well then, if it exists after the object of knowing,
From what is consciousness produced at that time?
In this way, the production of all phenomena
Is not to be realized.

It follows that the body is not inherently existent, because if it were inherently existent, one of the following – the individual branches of the body, the collection that is the summation of them, something different in entity from them – must be found to be the basis for characterization of the body, but it cannot be found. {436}

QUALM: Why is there doubt as to whether the collection that is the summation of all the branches is indeed the body?

RESPONSE: Since the body is imputed in dependence on the collection, it is inappropriate for the collection of all the branches of the body to be the body, because, otherwise, one would have to eventually assert final partless particles.

Therefore, at the time of searching to see how the body – the basis for engaging the convention “body” – exists from its side, [we see that] the feet or calves of the person are not the body of the person. The thighs and loins are also not the body. Neither are the abdomen and back the body. For, the body of the person is imputed in dependence on the person.

The chest and shoulders are not the body either. The ribs and hands are also not the body. The armpits and upper arms are also not the body. Even the inner organs are not the body of the person. The head and neck are also not the body of the person. That being the case, with regard to these branches, what is the body of the person? It is not any [of these branches]. Since the collection of them or something different in entity from them is also not the body of the person, the body does not exist inherently.

OPINION: There exists a gross body that is a different object from the branches.

RESPONSE: Either (1) this body that is the whole (possessing branches) that is a different object from the branches abides partially in all the branches, that is, with one part in the hands, one part in the calves, and so forth, or else, (2) the entire whole (part-possessor) without anything missing abides in each part. {437} In the first case, although indeed the parts of it abide in the parts such as the hands (such that the hands and so forth are pervaded by the whole), in what part does, for instance, the part that is the hand itself abide? There will be infinite [regression], because the hand, for instance, abides in its parts such as the fingers, and the fingers and so forth also abides in its parts.

If the branches are partless, whereby the individual parts do not abide in the individual branches, but the body, the complete branch-possessor in its entirety, were to abide in each part, the hands and so forth, as in the later investigation²³⁰, then however many hands there are and so forth, that many bodies would there be, thereby the parts will be infinite. It is only false; it is not truly established in the slightest.

In summary, when investigated through reasoning in this way, the body does not exist inherently outside the person that is asserted by the Buddhists, nor in the inner doer that is asserted by the Forders (Tirthikas, non-Buddhists). If it does not exist [inherently], how could an inherently existent body exist in the hands and so forth? It does not. If a body different in entity from the hands and so forth does not exist, how could the body exist inherently? It does not.

Although the body does not exist inherently, the cause for mistake is as follows. Therefore, although the body does not exist inherently, there is thus the reason for mistake. Although the body does not exist inherently, due to confusion regarding the arms and so forth as truly existent, the mind thinking “The body exists inherently” will be produced. {438} Like, due to the feature of it being arranged in the shape of likeness to a human being, an awareness of a human being is generated with respect to a cairn.

As long as the conditions for mistakes, such as a cairn and unclear illumination, are assembled, for that long the body will appear as though it were a person, that is, a human being. Likewise, as long as the assemblage of the conditions, one’s causes, the hands and so forth exist, for that long will a body appear where the branches are present. And an awareness apprehending the body as inherently existent will be generated.

For, Yongdzin Tamje Khyenpa says:

Regarding this mode of meditation on the close placement of mindfulness, from among the two modes of meditation - (1) on the body as unattractive through contemplating that the body is impermanent, suffering, and a conglomeration that gathers thirty-two unclean substances, and (2) on the body as empty of inherent existence, it is taught in terms of the latter here. The former mode of meditation

²³⁰ *Rtag pa* emended to read *brtags pa* in accordance with p. 640 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

appears in (i) the context of the beings of small and middling capacities [small and middle scopes of the *lam-rim*] and (ii) the context of teaching the mode of meditation of the body as being in the nature of uncleanness where one meditates on unattractiveness as an antidote to attachment as a branch of accomplishing calm-abiding.

However, with respect to the close placement of mindfulness of this context, although the mode of meditation is complete by implication, at the time of performing analysis on the body here, [Shantideva] analyzed by way of taking the collection that gathers many unclean substances, such as the teeth, nails, and mucus as the basis of imputation of the body. At that time, since the basis of imputation or the substratum [property-possessor] appears as an unclean conglomeration when it appears to the mind, the mode of meditation on unattractiveness is complete by implication. Understand them from [Shantideva's] *Compendium of Trainings (Sikṣasamuccaya)* which also teaches by way of sutra citations both the mode of meditation on unattractiveness and the mode of meditation on lack of inherent existence.

Its meaning is as follows. {439} If this so-called “body” were to exist from its own side without being merely imputed by the mind, then it would either (a) exist apart from the parts of the body, such as the head, legs and hands, or (b) be one with those parts.

If it exists apart [from the parts of the body], then, after eliminating the head, legs and hands, and so forth one by one, there must be something to be demonstrated: “The body is this.” But since there is nothing that can be demonstrated, the body that is established from its own side is utterly non-existent. Meditate by contemplating as explained above.

It is also not established as one with the parts of the body; the head is not body, the legs are not body, and the hands are not body. If one searches the parts one by one in this way, there is no such body that can be demonstrated. Furthermore, just as the branches – the head, the hands, and so forth – exist as many, the body that is the collection of all the branches also must be same in number.

When one searches through reasoning in this manner, since one utterly cannot find the body, that expressed as “body” and this appearance to the mind is nothing but merely imputed by conception, like a cairn imputed as a human being. Hence meditate on the body as lacking existence from its own side.

Thus the body of a man is imputed in dependence on the collection of branches but it lacks true existence. Similarly, because of being imputed upon the collection of portions²³¹ and fingers, also what is the hand established inherently? It is not possible. Because the fingers too are imputed in dependence on a collection of segments, they are not established inherently. {440} When the segments are also analyzed by dividing into their various parts, they are not established inherently.

When the parts of the segments are also divided into particles, they are not established inherently. When those particles are also divided into directional parts, such as the eastern [part] and so forth, since they are imputed in dependence on many directional parts, they are

²³¹ *Lha* emended to read *lhu* in accordance with p. 641 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa's commentary.

not established inherently. The division into directions too are not established inherently, because they are free from inherently established parts, like space. Therefore, particles also do not exist inherently. For, if they do, one must assert partless particles and that is damaged by reasonings such as “Due to simultaneous conjunction with six...”²³² Yongdzin Tamje Khyenpa says:

In just the way analysis has been performed on the body above, analyze the branches similarly and meditate on the lack of inherent existence. The so-called “hand” is merely imputed in dependence on the collection of the thumb, the forefinger, the little finger, and so forth; there is not even a mere atom of hand that is established inherently. Likewise the fingers are merely imputed in dependence on the collection of their own segments; there is no finger established from its own side. Even a segment is merely imputed upon the aggregation of its fine parts; it is utterly not inherently established from its own side. Thus contemplate that the body and all the branches of the body, besides being merely imputed upon their own basis of imputation, lack even a mere atom of true existence. {441}

Hence, when dream-like form is not analyzed, it appears as though self-instituting²³³; and when analyzed, it lacks inherent existence. Which discerning one would be attached to it? Attachment is inappropriate, because nobody has a competent focal object of the apprehension of true existence.

When, like that, the body of a man does not exist inherently, what are inherently existent men? What are inherently existent women? There is no inherently existent person.

Merely the refutation of a self-sufficient person by this text is not a fully qualified realization of selflessness of persons. Rather, one must realize the non-existence of a person who is not merely imputed by nominal convention. The two selflessnesses do not differ in ease or difficulty of realization, since the bases – persons and aggregates – do not differ in coarseness and subtlety of being substantially-existent or imputedly-existent, nor do they differ also in the attribute of coarseness and subtlety with respect to phenomena and the self that

²³² This line comes from a stanza in Vasubandhu’s *The Twenty*, which states that:

Due to simultaneous conjunction with six [particles]
A particle has six parts.
Also, if the six were in the same place,
Even a mass would be of the size of a particle.

Page 642 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary explains that:

If such a center minute particle were to be surrounded simultaneously by six particles on the six [directions] – the four cardinal directions, above and below – then the center particle would either have parts touching all six directional particles or it would not. In the first case, since it would have six parts touching the six directional particles, this contradicts it being partless. In the second case, since all the particles would be in the same place, it follows that even a conglomeration that is the aggregation of many particles would be [the size of] a minute particle.

For more details, refer to pages 402 & 403 of J. Hopkins’ *Maps of the Profound*, Snow Lion Publications, 2003.

²³³ *tshugs thub pa*

are the objects of refutation. You should understand that the dispute regarding whether or not hearer and solitary-realizer superiors realize the selflessness of phenomena by taking the system of the infeasibility of them having the realization of the selflessness of persons to be just talk of those who have not fathomed it.

Thus, the teaching that feelings also lack inherent existence just like the body is as follows. If the object of experience, suffering, and the experiencer, feeling, exist in reality, {442} then, why would [a suffering feeling] not damage the feelings of intense joy and happiness, (since, if the suffering feeling that exists in terms of a single mental consciousness were to exist inherently, then it would be inappropriate for it to transform into something else)? It [should] damage [the feelings of intense joy and happiness]. Therefore, if it must transform in the absence of the opportunity for generating happiness, then, since the generation [of happiness] is seen, the former [suffering feeling] does not exist inherently.

If happiness exists inherently, why do the minds of those tormented by the sorrow of a child having died and so on not find joy in eating delicious food and so forth? It follows that they [should] take joy [in eating delicious food and so forth], because the happiness due to [consuming] delicious food and drinks is generated inherently.

OPINION: Although there is the generation of happiness when one is tormented by sorrow, because it is overwhelmed by the strong suffering, the happiness is not experienced.

RESPONSE: How can that which is not the nature of experience be a happiness feeling? It follows that [such a happiness] is not [a happiness feeling], because [a feeling] is experienced. Likewise this can be applied to the reply with respect to inherently existent suffering being overwhelmed by the strong happiness.

OPINION: When strong happiness is generated, the suffering feeling exists subtly. Since it is experienced, it is not that it is not even slightly experienced.

RESPONSE: If the suffering feeling is subtle, what is the use of this strong happiness damaging the suffering? In that case, posit that strong happiness is experienced.

OPINION: Is not the gross [aspect] of this suffering dispelled by that strong happiness? {443} In asserting that it is dispelled, the subtle suffering is mere subtle joy in contrast to that great happiness.

RESPONSE: Since the subtle happiness also does not pass beyond the definition of that happiness, if it is subtle happiness, then it must be happiness.

Wishing to abandon the faults of saying “If there is happiness, why do those tormented by sorrow and so on...” [9.88c] the following is stated.

OPINION: The conditions of happiness contradictory to suffering are produced at the time of generating happiness from [consuming] delicious food and drinks, thereby suffering is not produced at that time.

RESPONSE: Conceiving it to be the feeling of happiness or suffering, is it not established as “strongly adhered to” and “being merely imputed”? It follows that it is established so, because it is imputed as the cause of both happiness and suffering through the force of conception [although]²³⁴ the food and drink are just the same.

Because of that lack of inherent existence of feelings, as an antidote to this apprehension of feelings as truly existent, this thorough analysis that realizes the lack of inherent existence of feelings is to be meditated on. Cultivating (1) the special insight observing the modes that arise from thorough investigation and analysis, and (2) the concentration that meditates on

²³⁴ Annotated in accordance with p. 644 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary by adding *kyang*.

special insight in dependence on calm-abiding, the body of realizations of a yogi will increase more and more and develop, whereby it is called “food,” just as ordinary food develops the body. This concentration also develops ordinary bodies. Hence one should make effort in realizing emptiness and setting [one’s mind] in single-pointed equipoise on it. {444}

The refutation of subtle particles meeting is as follows. If the minute particles of the two – sense power and object – were to meet, is there a gap between those two particles?

OPINION: There is a gap.

RESPONSE: Where would those particles meet? It follows that they would not meet, because there is a gap. There are particles of either illumination or darkness in that gap. Since there is even a gap there, there will not be contact.

OPINION: There is no gap.

RESPONSE: When two partless particles meet, since there are no two sides that meet or do not meet, all of them must meet all. In that case, since the location is mixed into one, they become a unit. That being so, what meeter would meet with what is to be met? It follows that this would not be so, because those two do not exist there.

Their reasons are as follows. A subtle particle does not enter, that is, absorb in, another subtle particle, because they are without an empty interval and because they are equal in dimensions. This is the statement of the reason for all of them meeting all [presented above]. There is pervasion because subtle particles do not enter each other and do not absorb. They do not mix, and partless [particles] that do not mix do not meet. How could it be right to say ‘Even though the partless meet?’ Since it is not possible, if you have seen that which meets and is partless, demonstrate it. You are not able to demonstrate it.

It is not correct for there to be an inherently existing meeting [of partless particles]²³⁵ with the primary consciousness which is without form or body, because [the primary consciousness] is without form. {445} The refutation of meeting a gross [object] is as follows. There is no inherently existing meeting with a gross [object] that is a collection of many particles, because even that is not a truly existent thing, just as the collection of segments was thoroughly analyzed before and refuted to be inherently existent.

Thus, if contact among the three – object, sense power, and primary consciousness – does not exist inherently as explained above, then from what cause do truly existent feelings arise if contact does not exist inherently? For, a false cause has no ability to generate a truly existent result. If feelings do not exist inherently, then for the sake of what is there this fatigue or effort for their purpose? For, it is meaningless.

OPINION: It is fatigue for the sake of abandoning inherently existent suffering feelings.

RESPONSE: That is incorrect; what object is it that damages what person? For, suffering feelings are not inherently existent.

In this world, there is a mere happiness that remedies suffering, but there is no specifically-characterized happiness like there is specifically-characterized suffering. For example, when pained by cold and abiding in the sun, on the occasion of the suffering of cold having become slightly weaker, that experiencer that experiences pleasure is happiness feeling. However, at that time the suffering of being pained by cold exists, because as soon as that suffering extinguishes, without interruption²³⁶ the suffering of heat comes to rear its head. {446} Therefore, suffering is necessary as a basis for imputing happiness, but happiness is not

²³⁵ Annotated in accordance with p. 646 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

²³⁶ *Par* emended to read *bar* in accordance with p. 647 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

needed as a basis for generating a mind of suffering, just like, for example, blue, and long and short.

That one turns away from craving if one realizes that feelings are not inherently existent is taught as follows. When it is realized that there is no inherently existing person who feels, and that the objects of experience and feelings also do not exist inherently, having seen this situation where neither the objects of feeling nor the feelers exist inherently, why do you not turn away from craving? For, craving that desires to obtain happiness and craving that desires to separate from suffering are induced by the strength of the apprehension of true existence.

Even though they are seen by the eye consciousness or touched by the body consciousness, due to the objects that generate feelings being empty of inherent existence and being of a nature similar to a dream or illusion, feelings also lack inherent existence. Because feelings are generated simultaneously with the mind, feelings are not seen by the mind, because different substances that are concurrent are not related.

Also, due to being generated from feelings either before or after them, it remembers them but does not experience them, because at that time it either has ceased or has not been generated. In summary, feelings do not experience their own natures, because they are refuted by the refutation of self-cognizers. Nor are they experienced by inherently existent others, {447} because the object of experience and the experiencer are not related.

Not only is the feeler not inherently existent, there is also no inherently existing person who feels, because it has been refuted on the occasion of refuting the self of persons. Hence feelings are not established in reality. Thus, due to this benefit on account of happiness and suffering, what damage is there to this inherently existent selfless collection of aggregates? Since even suffering does not exist inherently, it is appropriate to make effort in meditating on the close placement of mindfulness on feelings where feelings are also not inherently existent. Thus, the great Yongdzin Tamje Khyenpa says:

If suffering feelings were to exist inherently, then, just as it has been taught: “If it exists inherently, it contradicts reliance on causes and conditions,” they must abide without relying on causes and conditions and never relying on them. Happiness is generated by suffering transforming due to adventitious conditions, and, on an occasion of experiencing happiness feeling, suffering is generated adventitiously due to the condition of, for instance, hearing news of the death of a dear parent or relative. Thus, happiness and suffering feelings proceed by transforming adventitiously. Due to being established through experience itself, feelings do not have the power to abide independently at all. Hence, contemplate that apart from being merely imputed in dependence on causes and conditions, they are not established by way of their own entity at all. {448}

Even when the causes of feelings are investigated, they [are seen] also to lack inherent existence; that the cause of feeling is contact has been taught in the sutras which state “Due to the condition of contact, feeling.” Since the aggregation or meeting of the three – object, sense power and primary consciousness – is called “contact,” the so-called “meeting of the three” is merely imputed by mind. Since primary consciousness is without form, there is no meeting as in the particles meeting each other. If all the parts of the two – object and sense power – were to meet all, then since they mix with each other, they become one. If they do not

meet, then, since “meeting” is incorrect, when analyzed by reasoning, they are nothing but merely imputed by mind.

Similarly, one should meditate by investigating the object and object-possessor of feeling. Taking, for instance, suffering feeling as an illustration, if the experience of suffering feeling is established from its own side in the way it appears to the mind that is an apprehension of true existence, then the “suffering experience” is either: (1) an experience of itself by itself, or (2) an experience by a mind that is other than the suffering feeling itself.

It is inappropriate for it to experience itself, because (a) there will entirely be no differentiation “This is the object of experience” and “This is the experiencer” with respect to that, and (b) “It experiences itself” become irrelevant words even in the world, as in saying “Devadatta meets himself.”

If it is experienced by a mind that is other than itself, then: (i) it is experienced by a mind that precedes itself, (ii) it is experienced by a mind that arises later than itself, or (iii) it is experienced by a mind that is generated concurrently with itself. {449}

It is inappropriate for it to be experienced by a mind that arises before itself; since the mind that arises before itself has already ceased and does not exist at the time when the suffering feeling itself is generated, experience by it is incorrect.

Experience by a mind that arises later than itself is also not correct, because the suffering feeling itself has already ceased and does not exist at the time when the mind that arises later is generated.

Further, with respect to the expression “This experiences that,” the two – the object of experience and the experiencer – must exist concurrently, just as with respect to the expression “This man eats that food,” the two – the man and the food that he is eating – must exist concurrently. Experience by another mind that arises concurrently with itself is also inappropriate, because, although in general mere differentials need not be unrelated differentials, inherently existent differentials must be utterly unrelated. Hence if something were to be experienced by another unrelated mind, then the happiness and suffering that arose in the continuum of Devadatta would be able to be experienced by the mind of Yajña. Not only that, there is no generation of two discordant types of conceptualization in the continuum of one person, just as it has been taught in sutra that “The continua of primary consciousnesses of sentient beings are distinct.” The mode is explained in detail in the great texts such as [Dharmakīrti's] *Commentary on [Dignaga's] 'Compendium of Valid Cognition' (Pramanavarttikakarika)*.

Having analyzed in this way, contemplate that “the experience of suffering feeling” is merely imputed by the mind; it is utterly not established by way of its entity.

Likewise, contemplate that happiness and equanimity feelings also lack inherent existence through such analysis. {450}

Thus this meditation on the lack of inherent existence through detailed investigation regarding the causes and conditions of feelings, the entity of feelings, the object of experience, and the experiencer in this manner is very important. Due to happiness feelings appearing as inherently existent, attachment is generated. Similarly, it has been taught that aversion is generated from suffering,

and ignorance from equanimity. Therefore those wishing to sever the root of cyclic existence should meditate on the lack of inherent existence by stopping the appearance of and adherence to the causes of the three poisons – the three: happiness, suffering, and equanimity feelings – as truly existent. This is a very great essential point.

In this way, one investigates and then analyzes the entity of feelings and the causes of feelings. This refers to taking as the basis the mode of appearance that is the object of refutation in which feeling appears to exist by way of its own entity and is adhered to as so, and analyzing through reasoning. It is inappropriate to perform such analysis as to whether the object, sense power, and primary consciousness meet or not without the mode of appearance that is the object of refutation dawning as an object of the mind. For, if one were to analyze in this manner, mere conventionalities would be harmed, whereby not only will ascertainment of the view not be produced, even dependently-arising appearances would be damaged. Hence it is very important to know thus the mode of analysis through reasoning by having contacted the object of refutation.

The close placement of mindfulness on minds is as follows.

The mentality²³⁷ lacking inherent existence does not abide inherently in the six powers; it does not abide inherently in the six objects, forms and so forth; it also does not abide amidst them, that is, in the collection of those two [powers and objects]. Recall the sevenfold analysis of the chariot just as it has been taught in [Chandrakirti's] *Supplement to the Middle Way* (*Madhyamakavatara*). {451 } A mind which is imputed by the Folders to be the inner doer being does not inherently exist inside; mind does not exist outside in the hands and so forth; it is also not found inherently somewhere other than inside and outside.

It is not the body; it is not a truly existent other-than-that. The mind is not mixed with the body, nor is it inherently separate, or apart from it. It is not inherently existent in the slightest; therefore, that very emptiness of inherent existence of the mind [of all sentient beings]²³⁸ is a natural nirvana.

If the sense consciousness existed before the object of knowing, through observing what would it be produced? For, the observed object condition did not precede it.

If the consciousness and the object of knowing are simultaneous, through observing what would it be produced? For, (1) if the sense consciousness has not been produced, then it cannot be produced since the observed object condition has not been produced, and (2) if the observed object condition has been produced, then since the consciousness has already been produced, there is no need for it to be produced.

Well then, if the sense consciousness exists after the object of knowing, from what is the sense consciousness inherently produced at that time? For, this is incorrect.

If it is produced from a disintegrated previous instant, then a sprout would be produced from a burnt seed. If it is produced from an undisintegrated previous [instant], then it can either be interrupted or not be interrupted by another time. From among these two

²³⁷ Note that the “mentality” (*gid*) here does not refer to a mindset or frame of mind, as in the usual connotations of the English word. It is the sixth among the 6 powers, eye and so forth.

²³⁸ Annotated in accordance with p. 650 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa's commentary.

possibilities, in the first case, actual production would not be possible. In the latter case, if all of itself does not interrupt all, then [the times of the former and later instants]²³⁹ would be mixed simultaneously. {452} True existence degenerates if there are two factors – interruption and non-interruption [by time]. Hence there is no true existence. Thus, Yongdzin Tamje Khyenpa says:

If the so-called “mind” were to exist inherently, then it either: (1) exists in the six sense powers, eye and so forth, and the six objects, forms and so forth, or (2) exists apart from them. It does not exist in terms of these sense powers and objects; it is easy to realize that the mind is not each of them. Further, if it were to exist in terms of them like a fruit dwelling inside a metal bowl²⁴⁰, then just as the metal bowl can be demonstrated after removing the fruit, one must be able to demonstrate “The eye primary consciousness is this” in the wake of eliminating the eye sense power. This is not the case. If there is no eye, there is also no eye primary consciousness. Likewise, extend the reasoning to the other sense powers. When one investigates in this way, contemplate that besides being merely imputed by mind, the so-called “mind” does not exist inherently.

As explained above, having identified well the mode of appearance that is the object of refutation in which the mind appears to exist truly and is adhered to as so, place it on the mind. By way of analyzing through those reasonings explained above, the lack of true existence is proved. When one, following mere words without ascertaining what the object of refutation is, analyzes, “Does the mind exist inside or outside the body?” and “Does it exist in terms of the objects and the sense powers or not?” and fails to find it, one thinks, “The mind does not exist.” Such apprehension is utterly inappropriate. If one were to hold this, then this would be a view of annihilation since the mind is held as utterly non-existent. {453}.

Furthermore, analysis of the view with regards to the mode of appearance of conventionalities without having identified the object of refutation is analysis of the foolish who are not skilled in the essential points of both of the two truths, and damages dependently-arising appearances. This is taught again and again by Acharya Chandrakirti in his root text and commentary of *Supplement to the Middle Way (Madhyamakavatara)*. As cited earlier, Acharya Shantideva also emphatically taught that refuting this mere conventional appearance is inappropriate.

The All-Knower of Definitive Meanings, Venerable Konchog Tenpe Dronme, said:

*It is easy for some, failing to aim at the target of
The demarcation of the object of refutation,
To cut it in a limited way, whereby emptiness is mistaken but appears
And dependent-arising destroyed; they become objects of reproach.*

²³⁹ Annotated in accordance with p. 651 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

²⁴⁰ *Mkhar* emended to read *’khar*.

Regarding the meditation on the close placement of mindfulness on phenomena, in the way explained above, the inherent production of all phenomena will not be realized; one should realize the lack of inherent existence of all phenomena included in the compounded and un-compounded as taught in the *Teachings of Akshayamati Sutra (Akshayamatiniṛdeśhasūtra)*. Yongdzin Tamje Khyenpa says:

Just as the body, feelings, and minds lack inherent existence by having analyzed with reasoning as explained, when investigating the mental factors other than feelings, other compounded phenomena such as time, and all un-compounded phenomena being none other than mere names, mere nomenclature, and appearances to the mind, meditate on the lack of any inherent existence. {454}

3B2B-2B3D-1B3B-2. Dispelling quarrels that the two truths are incorrect

- 9.106 In that case, conventionalities would not exist.
How could there be two truths with respect to them?
Moreover, they are also conventional due to another.
How could sentient beings pass beyond sorrow?
- 9.107 This is a conceptualization that is another mind,
It is not our conventionality.
After that, if ascertained, it exists;
If not, conventional existence would be non-existence.
- 9.108 The conception and that which is conceived,
The two, are mutually dependent.
In dependence on how they are renowned,
All of the analyzed are expressed.
- 9.109 When one analyzes by way of analysis
That analyzes,
Because that analyzer also
Would be analyzed, it would be endless.
- 9.110 When the object of analysis is analyzed,
The support for the analysis does not exist.
Because the support does not exist, they are not produced.
That also is expressed as nirvana.
- 9.111 The two as truly existent from their point of view
Abides with great difficulty.
“An object is established from the power of a consciousness.”
What can be supported on an existent consciousness?

- 9.112 “Nevertheless, the consciousness is established from the object of knowing²⁴¹.”
What can be supported on an existent object of knowing?
Existing by the force of one another,
Both are also not existent.
- 9.113 If he is without a son, he is not a father.
From where would that son arise?
Without a son, there is no father;
Likewise the two do not exist.
- 9.114 “Just as²⁴² a sprout is produced from a seed and
The seed is realized by just that, likewise,
Due to a consciousness that is produced from an object of knowing,
Why is its existence not realized?”
- 9.115 If, by a consciousness that is different from the sprout,
“The seed exists” is realized, {455}
Then by what is the existence of a consciousness
Realizing the object of knowing realized?

OPINION: Previously, through investigating the object and object-possessor, and the former and later, existence by way of its own character was refuted. In that case, the faults with respect to the assertion of conventional existence are also similar. If existence by way of its own character is not possible, then no phenomenon whatsoever can be posited, whereby conventionalities would not exist. How could there be two truths with respect to them? Both of them would not exist. In the perspective of an all-obscuring mind that adheres to existence by way of its own character, forms, sounds, and so forth exist truly. But you asserted that since objects lack true existence from their own side, they exist conventionally. In that case, the conventionalities of yours, like the existence as a snake in the perspective of adherence to a snake although there is no snake from the side of the rope, are also posited to exist conventionally by way of mere clinging (*rloms pa*) to exist due to another mind. Thus, how could sentient beings pass beyond sorrow even conventionally? It follows that the attainment of liberation is impossible, because all existents are nothing but confusion due to error. It follows that determining the view for the sake of attaining liberation is meaningless.

RESPONSE: That – this “conventional existence asserted by the Middle-Way proponents” is mere clinging to existence by a conceptualization that is a mind of apprehension of true existence, another mind that is mistaken with respect to the object of adherence – is not the meaning of a conventional existence in our system of the Middle-Way proponents. In our system, after²⁴³ all phenomena asserted to be the objects of the view which realizes the mode of abidance are realized to be empty of inherent existence, if one is able to posit the existence of ascertainment of the conventional existence of object and agent such as the object of

²⁴¹ *Pa* emended to read *bya*.

²⁴² *Bzhan* emended to read *bzhin*.

²⁴³ *Phyir* emended to read *phyis* in accordance with p. 652 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

production and the producer, by way of the mode of establishment by a valid cognizer without muddle, then that is the meaning of conventional existence. {456} Otherwise, if one does not know how to posit the establishment of object and agent by a valid cognizer, then even conventional existence would degenerate to non-existence.

The way of positing conventionality in our system is just as it has been taught in [Nagarjuna's] *Fundamental Wisdom (Treatise on the Middle Way, Mulamahyamakavrtti-prasannapada*, stanza 8.12a):

An agent depends on acts...

The two – the object-possessor, the conception, and the object, that which is conceived – are posited through mutual dependence, that is, reliance; there is not the slightest existence by way of its own entity. All of the analyzed, that is, presentations, are expressed in dependence on mere name according to how they are renowned to a valid cognizer of worldly conventionalities.

OPINION: When one analyzes the emptiness of inherent existence by way of analysis that analyzes whether or not phenomena exist truly, since the mind of the one analyzing is not included within the objects of analysis at that time, is it necessary or unnecessary that it be analyzed as lacking true existence? If it is unnecessary, then, since others are similar, [the position of] all phenomena lacking true existence would degenerate. If it is necessary, then, because that analyzer also needs to be analyzed as lacking true existence by another analysis, the analyses would be endless.

RESPONSE: It follows that the valid cognizer that realizes all phenomena to lack true existence does not need another valid cognizer to analyze it as lacking true existence, because, (i) having analyzed that the object of analysis – all phenomena – lack true existence, as long as the mode of apprehension of that valid cognizer that analyzed them as lacking true existence does not fade, {457} a truly existent property-possessor [or substratum] – the support that requires analysis as lacking true existence – does not exist as the entity of that mind, and (ii) until the act of having already realized that all phenomena are empty of true existence in the person who realized that weakens, a property-possessor [or substratum], the basis that is distinguished by analysis wondering “Is this truly existent or not?”, is not possible. For, as soon as a mind wondering so is generated, the mindfulness thinking “It lacks true existence” will be generated.

This is because [if]²⁴⁴, although all phenomena are realized as lacking true existence, another valid cognizer is necessary to analyze that very mind as lacking true existence, then you will accrue the fault of infinite [regression], and if another analysis is necessary there would be remaining acquired apprehension of true existence left, [but] all manifest acquired apprehensions of true existence would already have been overcome by that very earlier valid cognizer.

Because the support, the property-possessor, does not exist truly, both the object of refutation and the refutation are not produced truly. That also is expressed as natural nirvana. It is also described as attaining nirvana by way of separation from adventitious stains from having realized that meaning and familiarizing with it.

²⁴⁴ Annotated in accordance with p. 655 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa's commentary.

The establishment of the two – the object and consciousness – as truly existent from the point of view of the Propounders of Things abides with great difficulty, because there is no proof.

OPINION: The establishment of a truly existent object is posited from the power²⁴⁵ of truly existent consciousness, that is, valid cognizer.

RESPONSE: What valid cognizer can be backed and supported on a truly existent consciousness? There is none. {458} This is because self-cognizers do not exist, and because if a consciousness is known by another, it would be endless.

OPINION: Nevertheless, the consciousness is established from this object of knowing and object of comprehension that are directly established to be truly existent.

RESPONSE: What can be backed and supported on an existent object of knowing? For, if posited by a valid cognizer, then they²⁴⁶, the two – object and consciousness, would exist by the force of relying on one another. Both would also be clearly established as not inherently existent, just like long and short, and that side and this side.

If he is without a son, he is not a father, for there is nothing there to posit. If there is no father, from where would that son arise? For, there is no cause. Without a son, there is no father, whereby the two are mutually reliant; likewise the two – object and consciousness – do not exist truly.

OPINION: Just as a sprout is produced from an inherently existent seed, and the seed is realized, that is, it can be inferred, from the correct sign which is just that sprout, likewise, due to a truly existent consciousness that is produced from an object of knowing, why is the existence of an ultimate truly existent object of knowing not realized? It must be realized.

RESPONSE: That is incorrect. If, a sprout is seen by a valid cognizer consciousness that is a different substance from the sprout, and “The seed exists” is realized, then by what valid cognizer is the existence of a consciousness, due to its realizing the object of knowing, realized? For, self-cognizers have already been refuted and you also do not accept other knowers.

3B2B-2B3D-1B3B-3. Stating the reason that proves selflessness

3B2B-2B3D-1B3B-3A. Reason of diamond fragments {459}

3B2B-2B3D-1B3B-3B. Reason of dependent-arising

3B2B-2B3D-1B3B-3C. Reason of existence and non-existence, production and cessation

3B2B-2B3D-1B3B-3A. Reason of diamond fragments

9.116 Sometimes by a direct perceiver of
 Worldly beings, all causes are seen.
 The divisions of the stems of lotuses and so forth
 Are produced by divisions of causes.

9.117 “By what are the divisions of causes made?”
 It comes from the divisions of previous causes.
 “Why are causes able to produce results?”
 They come from the very strength of previous causes.

²⁴⁵ *Dpe* emended to read *dbang* in accordance with p. 655 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

²⁴⁶ *Des te* emended to read *de ste* in accordance with p. 656 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

- 9.118 “Ishvara is the cause of migrating beings.”
For the time being, what is Ishvara? Say it!
“He is the elements.” It is indeed like that;
Why tire yourself out even for a mere name?
- 9.119 Nevertheless, since earth and so forth are many,
Impermanent, without movement, not a god,
To be walked on, and unclean,
They are not Ishvara himself.
- 9.120 Ishvara is not space because it is without movement.
He is not the self because that has already been refuted before.
“He is also a creator who is not an object of thought.”
What is the point of talking about that which is not an object of thought?
- 9.121 Also what is he asserted to produce?
Are not the entity of the self,
Earth and so forth, and Ishvara permanent?
Consciousness is produced from an object of knowing and
- 9.122 Beginningless happiness and suffering come from karma.
What is produced by him? Say it!
If the cause does not have a beginning,
How could there be a beginning of results?
- 9.123 Why would it not always create?
If he does not rely on others and²⁴⁷
There does not exist other that is not created by him,
On what would that [produced] by him rely?
- 9.124 If there is reliance, then the very collection
Would be the cause, not Ishvara.
When assembled, he lacks the power to not produce them, and
When they are absent, he lacks the power to produce them. {460}
- 9.125 If they are created without Ishvara desiring them,
It would follow that it is under the control of another.
Even if they are desired, if they are created
In dependence on desire, what would become of Ishvara?
- 9.126 Those propounding permanent subtle particles,
Also were already overcome before.
The Samkyas assert that a permanent Principal
Is the cause of migrating beings.

²⁴⁷ One line “*de ni gzhan la ltos pa min*” is missing in this edition of the Tibetan text.

- 9.127 The abiding in equilibrium of qualities
Called “lightness, motility, and darkness”
Is finely expressed to be that called “Principal.”
The non-equilibrium is said to be going.
- 9.128 It is inappropriate for the three natures [to exist]
Unitarily. Therefore it does not exist.
Likewise, the qualities do not exist
Because they too have three aspects individually.
- 9.129 If the qualities do not exist, also the existence of
Sound and so forth becomes extremely farfetched.
In mindless cloth and so forth,
It is not possible for happiness and so forth to exist.
- 9.130 If things exist in the nature of their causes.
Have things not already been analyzed?
Your causes are also happiness and so forth themselves.
Woolen blankets and so forth also do not arise from it.
- 9.131 From woolen blankets there is happiness and so forth.
Because they do not exist, happiness and so forth do not exist.
Happiness and so forth have never
Been observed to be permanent.
- 9.132 If the manifestation happiness and so forth exist,
Why is the experience not apprehended?
If it becomes subtle,
Then how is it gross and also subtle?
- 9.133 Since having given up being gross, they become subtle,
Those gross and subtle ones are just impermanent.
Likewise, why do you not assert
All things to be impermanent?
- 9.134 If a gross [object] is not other than happiness,
Happiness is just an impermanent manifestation.
When asserting “That which does not exist whatsoever
Is not produced because it does not exist,” {461}
- 9.135 Although you do not assert that
The non-manifest are produced, they abide.
If the result abides in the cause,
To eat food would be to eat excrement.

- 9.136 You should buy cotton seeds
With the price of cotton cloth²⁴⁸ and wear them.
“Due to confusion the worldly do not see.”
But those who know reality posit it.
- 9.137 Why do those knowing reality,
Who exist among the worldly, also not see it?
“The worldly is not a valid cognizer.”
Also seen manifestations would not be true.
- 9.138 “If valid cognizers are not valid,
Would that comprehended by them not be false?
Meditation on emptiness in view of that
Would, because of that, be incorrect.”
- 9.139 Without contacting the thing that is imputed
The lack of things which are that is not apprehended.
Therefore, what is the thing that is false?
The lack of thing which is that is clearly false.
- 9.140 Therefore, regarding the death of a son in a dream,
The conceptualization thinking “He does not exist,”
Blocks the conceptualization that he exists;
But that too is false.
- 9.141 Therefore, by thorough analysis in this way,
Nothing exists without a cause.
They also do not abide individually,
Nor in conditions that are an aggregation of all.
- 9.142ab Also, not coming from something else,
They do not abide, they do not go.

Ayatas (Those Who are Flung Afar): We do not see anyone creating the variegated feathers of peacocks and so forth. The roughness and smoothness of lotus petals, the sharpness of thorns, and so forth are not created by any creator. Therefore, they arise from [their own] entity.

RESPONSE: That is incorrect, because (i) sometimes by a direct perceiver of worldly beings, {462} all causes that are producers with respect to most outer and inner things such as harvests are seen, and (ii) the divisions of results such as colors of the stems and number of petals of lotuses and so forth are produced by a diversity of divisions of causes.

[Ayatas]: By what is the diversity of divisions of causes made?

RESPONSE: It comes from the diverse divisions of previous causes.

²⁴⁸ *Zas* emended to read *ras*.

[Ayatas]: Why are diverse²⁴⁹ causes able to produce diverse results?

RESPONSE: There is no fault of inability, because they come from the very strength of the previous causes; since the causes are diverse, they are able to produce individual diverse results.

Therefore, the subject – these things – are not causeless because they are observed to be produced at certain places and times.

The Naiyayikas, the Vaisheshikas, and one faction of the Samkhyas who assert Ishvara to be a god²⁵⁰: The all-knowing self-arisen Ishvara created all abodes, bodies, and enjoyments by first making an idea in mind. Hence he is the cause of migrating beings

RESPONSE: For the time being, what is the meaning of Ishvara? Say it!

[The Naiyayikas, the Vaisheshikas and one faction of the Samkhyas who assert Ishvara as a god²⁵¹]: He is the elements since results increase and decrease due to the increase and decrease of the elements such as earth.

RESPONSE: It is indeed like that; even you assert that results increase and decrease due to the increase and decrease of the elements. However, why exhaust yourself with great hardship to prove Ishvara even for a mere different name that has no different meaning? It follows that such exhaustion is inappropriate.

If there are great differences in meaning such as [one] being permanent and [the other] being impermanent and so forth, then this is inappropriate as Ishvara. Such inappropriateness is reflected in the word “Nevertheless” [in 9.119a]. {463} Since the substances – the earth element and so forth – are in the nature of being many, impermanent in that they are produced and disintegrate, and without movement in the sense of first making an idea in the mind to create a result, and the elements are not a god, are to be walked on by²⁵² feet and so forth, and are unclean, they are not Ishvara himself. For, [you] asserted that he is permanent, is unitary, first makes an idea in mind to produce a result, and is a god, and asserted that he is clean²⁵³ and not to be walked²⁵⁴ on.

OPINION: Space is Ishvara.

RESPONSE: The subject – space– is not Ishvara, because it is without movement for the sake of results. He is also not the permanent self because both matter and knower have already been refuted before.

OPINION: Since Ishvara is a creator who is not an object of thought, there are not those faults.

RESPONSE: What is the point of talking about an agent and acts that are not objects of thought? For, you also do not know who Ishvara is and cannot think about it.

²⁴⁹ Na emended to read *ba* in accordance with p. 657 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

²⁵⁰ This one faction of the Samkhyas who assert Ishvara as a god refers to the theistic Samkhyas. The non-theistic Samkhyas do not take Ishvara to be a god.

²⁵¹ This one faction of the Samkhyas who assert Ishvara as a god refers to the theistic Samkhyas. The non-theistic Samkhyas do not take Ishvara to be a god.

²⁵² *Kyi bsgom* emended to read *kyis ‘gom* in accordance with p. 659 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

²⁵³ *Mi* is deleted in accordance with p. 659 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

²⁵⁴ *Bsgom* emended to read *‘gom*.

OPINION: To the question, ‘If happiness and suffering feelings are produced from past karma and so forth, what result is that Ishvara accepted by you asserted to produce?’ [I would answer] “The self”.’

RESPONSE: It follows that it is incorrect. It follows that neither of the entities of later similar-in-types to the self, earth and so forth, nor Ishvara are created by Ishvara. For, are not the self, subtle particles of the four elements, Ishvara, and so forth permanent? Since you asserted that they are permanent, it is not correct that they be objects of production and producers. Therefore, it is because past nose sense consciousness and so forth are produced from previous objects of knowing and {464} because since beginningless time happiness and suffering feelings come from virtuous and non-virtuous karma. What result is produced by that Ishvara? Say it! Results produced by him are not possible. If the cause Ishvara does not have a beginning since it is a permanent thing, how could there be a beginning of results such as present feelings? For, even the cause, the potential, the thing that produced today’s feeling since beginningless time is beginningless.

Why would that Ishvara not always create all results? He does not do so, because he relies on some other condition to create all results, because if there does not exist some other result that is not created by him, on what condition would this result produced by that Ishvara rely? For, that which is asserted to be the cooperative condition must also be created by Ishvara, and creation by him is sufficient.

If the production of the result by Ishvara relies on cooperative conditions, then it follows that the very collection of substantial and cooperative conditions would be the cause; Ishvara is not a cause with self-power. For, when the collection of causes and conditions are assembled, Ishvara lacks the power to not produce the result, and when that collection is absent, even Ishvara lacks the power to produce them.

If the result of hell sufferings and the like are created by karma without Ishvara desiring them, it would follow that that Ishvara is under the control of another, whereby [the position] that it is the self-powered creator of all would degenerate. {465} Even if the results are created through Ishvara desiring to create results, the result would be contingent on mere desire. If results are created through desire, what would become of Ishvara? For, desire is impermanent.

Those Vaisheshikas propounding permanent subtle particles as the creator of various migrating beings also were already overcome before through reasoning refuting partless particles. Hence there is no need to stomp on that already dead.

According to the Samkyas, the nature that is the Principal is not a transformation. The seven – the great one and so forth²⁵⁵ – are natures and transformations.²⁵⁶ The sixteen²⁵⁷ are transformations. The person is neither a nature nor a transformation. From among these twenty-five objects of knowing, the Principal possesses five characteristics – being permanent, being unitary, and so forth. The Samkyas assert that it is the cause of migrating beings who are the various transformations.

²⁵⁵ The seven refer to the great one, I-principle and the five subtle objects (sounds, tangible objects, odors, visible forms and tastes).

²⁵⁶ JN: “and transformations” has been added in accordance with the Tibetan.

²⁵⁷ The sixteen refers to the 11 faculties (speech, arms, legs, anus, genitalia, ear, body or skin, tongue, eye, nose and intellectual faculty) and the 5 elements (space, wind, fire, water and earth).

The state²⁵⁸ of equilibrium of all three qualities called “lightness, motility, and darkness” – the synonyms of the three: happiness, suffering and equanimity – is finely expressed as the “Principal.” The non-equilibrium of the three is said to be going, that is, transformation. It is repudiated as follows.

The subject – objects of knowing – it follows that it is inappropriate for the three natures – happiness and so forth – to exist in a unitary visual form and the like, and in a partless Principal, because being unitary would be impossible. Since many would also be impossible if being unitary were to be impossible, there would be utter non-existence. Therefore a partless Principal which is in the nature of the three qualities does not exist. {466} Likewise, the qualities themselves do not exist truly unitarily because they too each have three aspects individually.

Analyzing in this manner, if the Principal which is the three qualities in equilibrium does not exist, also the existence of sound and so forth becomes extremely farfetched, because [the Samkhyas] asserted just those five to be the transformations of the Principal. That in turn is because they are mindless matter. The subject – cloth and so forth – it follows that it is not possible for them to exist as a nature that is one substantial entity of establishment and abiding²⁵⁹ of happiness and so forth. If things that are transformations such as cloth exist truly in the nature of their causes, happiness and so forth, then it is not that things are analyzed to be truly existent, because true existence has already been refuted. If, according to you, the causes of woolen blankets and so forth are also the Principal himself which is happiness and so forth in equilibrium, then woolen blankets and so forth also do not arise from the Principal, because the Principal is impossible.

If from woolen blankets and the like happiness and so forth are generated, then because woolen blankets and the like do not exist afterwards, even the Principal which is happiness and so forth in equilibrium would not exist, because a causeless result is impossible. Asserting that is inappropriate, because [you] asserted that the Principal is a permanent thing. It follows that the natures of happiness and so forth have never been permanent, because such is not observed by a valid cognizer.

If the thing that is the manifestation happiness exists, then why is the experience of happiness not apprehended at the time of generating suffering? It follows that it is apprehended. If that happiness becomes subtle at that time, {467} then how is it gross and, through discarding that, also subtle? It follows that it is not, because it is permanent. Since through discarding being subtle, happiness and so forth become gross, and through discarding being gross, they become subtle, it follows that those gross and subtle ones are just impermanent. Likewise, why do you not assert all things to be impermanent property-possessors? It follows that asserting that is appropriate, because natures transform variously into others.

Is a gross [object] established other than happiness, that is, is it a substance other than happiness, or not? In the first case, happiness would be experienced even if the gross [object] is averted, whereby [your position] that the experience of manifestation happiness is a gross [object] would degenerate. If it is not other substance [than happiness], then even happiness would be just an impermanent manifestation, because when the gross [object] stops,

²⁵⁸ Na emended to read *ni* in accordance with p. 661 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

²⁵⁹ *Grub bde rdzas gcig*

happiness also stops. If you assert that, [your position] that the nature of happiness and the like is permanent would degenerate.

OPINION: When asserting “Since something that is produced must exist at the time of the cause, that which does not exist whatsoever at the time of the cause is not produced because it does not exist in the nature of the cause,” what is your meaning of production? Even though the nature exists previously, its state is a manifestation of what is not previously manifest as an object of the mind.

RESPONSE: Since you assert that a manifestation is produced without being existent at the time of the cause, although you do not assert a result that is previously non-existent and newly produced, it abides. This is merely accepting the meaning but not asserting the convention. Alternatively, it is explained “Although you do not assert that a previously non-existent manifestation, that is, transformation, is newly produced, you must assert that it abides.” {468}

If the result abides in the manner of a non-different nature in the cause, it follows that to eat food would be to eat excrement, because the nature of the food and the nature of the excrement are a partless unit. In asserting that that very Principal is the nature of all phenomena, mode of abidance, the ultimate, and a partless permanent, [you] asserted that the nature of the food and the nature of the excrement are one.

Furthermore, you should buy cotton seeds with the price of cotton cloth and wear them. It follows that wearing that is acceptable, because the nature of cotton garments and the nature of cotton seeds are a partless unit.

OPINION: Although those two are one nature, due to confusion the worldly do not see that the result exists at the time of the cause, thereby they do not wear cotton seeds.

RESPONSE: Since you Samkhyas assert that your teachers, the Sage Ling-gye²⁶⁰ and so forth, are all-knowing, due to knowing the reality of results existing at the time of the causes, they would posit it. Since you also know reality, when you eat food, you would be eating excrement and so forth.

According to your system, why do those knowing reality, who also exist among the worldly, also not see that the result exists at the time of the cause? It follows that they see it, because they know that the result exists at the time of the cause posited by the Samkhyas. Further, your teachers whom you assert to know reality in the lines above are also seen persistently to wear cotton garments instead of cotton seeds. Hence, it is obvious that the result does not exist at the time of the cause. {469}

OPINION: The seeing of the worldly is not a valid cognizer. Therefore it is a misconception.

RESPONSE: It follows that also manifestations, transformations, natures that are manifestly seen by the worldly would not be true, because the seeing of the worldly is not a valid cognizer.

OPINION: If, according to you, valid cognizers are not ultimately valid, then would the object of comprehension comprehended by those false valid cognizers not be false, errors that are not established in the way they are comprehended? It follows that they would be [false], because the comprehenders are false valid cognizers. Meditation on emptiness asserted by you in view of that reason would be erroneous, incorrect, because the valid cognizers that comprehended them are false.

²⁶⁰ P. 664 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary reads “*drang srong ser skya*” which refers to the Sage Kapila.

RESPONSE: The subject – objects of knowing – it is very correct for us [Middle-Way proponents]²⁶¹ that the valid cognizer comprehending emptiness is false, and also that the emptiness posited by that is false, because the ascertainment of the refutation in which the thing that is true existence is refuted by conception is contingent upon the dawning of the object of refutation. That follows, because without contacting through conception the thing that is imputed, true existence, that is, without the dawning of true existence, the lack of true existence in things²⁶² which are empty of true existence is not apprehended through conception. Therefore, what is the thing that is the false object of refutation? Since it is not possible, the lack of the thing which is that²⁶³ object of refutation having been refuted is clearly false.²⁶⁴

The analogy above is like: without the aspect of the son of a barren woman dawning to conception, the aspect of the death of the son of a barren woman does not dawn. If the emptiness of true existence (which is the object of refutation having been refuted) is truly existent, then to an inferential knower consciousness, the appearances that are empty of true existence must be truly existent. {470} In that case, a collection in which one of them has been refuted is not possible. Due to the object of refutation appearing truly existent to it, even the appearance of true existence must be truly existent. For, in that case, if true existence must exist, then it is non-existent. This teaches the meaning of [Nagarjuna’s] *Fundamental Wisdom (Treatise on the Middle Way, Mulamahyamakavrttiprasannapada, stanza 13.7a)*:

*If a bit of the non-empty existed,
[A bit of the empty would also exist.
If there did not exist a bit of the non-empty,
How could the empty exist?]*²⁶⁵

Since, without the generality of true existence dawning, one does not ascertain well the emptiness of true existence, one must be skillful in the apprehension of the measure of the object of refutation. Therefore, for example, regarding the observation of the death of a son in a dream, the conceptualization thinking “The son does not exist,” blocks the conceptualization thinking “The son exists.” But the two – the object of abandonment [the conceptualization thinking “The son exists,”] and the antidote [the conceptualization thinking “The son does not exist,”] – are also false. Likewise, there is no contradiction that a false object of abandonment is demolished by a false antidote, and a false object of comprehension is comprehended by a false valid cognizer. However, since the Samkhyas assert all objects of knowing to be truly existent, they do not know how to posit a false valid cognizer. Hence, they are not similar.

Therefore, by analysis through reasoning in the way explained above, we have the concluding summary that refutes causeless production: “Not only is production from a

²⁶¹ Annotated in accordance with p. 665 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

²⁶² Note that “thing” refers to any existent here, whereas it refers to true existence later in the same stanza according to this commentary.

²⁶³ *Te ‘di yis* emended to read *te yi* in accordance with p. 666 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

²⁶⁴ P. 666 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary says “The emptiness that is a lack of the thing which is that true existence is clearly false.”

²⁶⁵ *stong pa’ang cung zad yod par ‘gyur / mi stong cung zad yod min na / stong pa yod par ga la ‘gyur*

discordant cause such as Ishvara and the Principal impossible, no result whatsoever is produced and exists without a cause.” These four lines of the text [9.141] can also be applied to concluding summaries that refute production from the three possibilities. Apply them also to the reasoning that refutes production from both self and others. {471}

(i) Results such as sprouts also do not abide individually in water, manure, heat, and moisture, and the like, nor abide inherently in conditions that are an aggregation of all [of them, water and the like]²⁶⁶ in the manner of juniper fruits supported in a metal bowl, because if they do, such should be observable, but they are not observed to be so, and (ii) they do not even exist at that time, because without the conditions changing in aspect, sprouts are not produced. Also, not coming from something else other than those conditions, they do not abide already established in a manner of inherent existence; they do not go somewhere else having ceased. Thus there is not the slightest inherent existence. Therefore there is no production from self, production from others, and production from both self and others.

In short, the property of the subject in the following is proven: “The subject – the aggregates and the person – are not inherently produced, because they are not produced from self, not produced from others, not produced from both self and others, nor produced causelessly.” Thus, Yongdzin Tamje Khyenpa also says:

Compounded phenomena, such as the I and the aggregates of I, are not produced inherently, because they are not produced from self, not produced from something that is a different substance from self, not produced from both, nor produced causelessly.

They are not produced from self; something produced from itself is impossible, and if that were the case, production would be meaningless.

If they are produced from others, and if it is an other that is established by its own entity, {472} then they would be mutually unrelated, and in that case, even a vase would be produced from a pillar and so forth, whereby production from others is incorrect.

If you thus ascertain the non-existence of production from self and others, you will be able to ascertain that there is no production from both.

If they are produced causelessly, then it must be the case that even flowers would be produced in the sky. Thus it is easy to realize that there is no causeless production.

This reasoning is very extensive, because this is carried in most of the infinite reasonings such as investigation of production and cessation, investigation of going and coming, and so forth in [Nagarjuna’s] *Fundamental Wisdom (Treatise on the Middle Way, Mulamahyamakavrṭti-prasannapada)* and must be known.

Do not think: “Since the refutations of production from self and the like here are associated with the Forders, we do not need them now.” Regardless of whether Forders exist or not in reality, we must prevent these easy bad views from developing in our continua. Hence, without knowing these reasonings, we will have no way to stop them.

The reason why this reasoning is called “The Diamond Fragments” is that just as even a tiny part of a diamond gem is able to perform any of the functions such as penetrating, cutting, polishing all other types of gems such as turquoise, pearl and gold, like a stone doing

²⁶⁶ Annotated in accordance with p. 667 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

that to mud, likewise this reasoning is able to cut through all the masses of bad views, whereby it is called such.

This reasoning is also explained in Jowo [Atisha]’s *Lamp on the Path to Enlightenment (Bodhipatha-pradipa)*; it is taught clearly [in stanza 49]:

*Since an entity does not arise from itself,
And is not from another, or even from both,
Nor is it yet without cause; therefore it has
No intrinsic nature by way of own-existence. {473}*

Furthermore, there are a great many who hold these bad views although they do not claim to be followers of Forders such as the Samkhyas. There are also a lot of people who assert that, since all these outer appearances are mistaken appearances, nothing exists in reality, and who assert that one’s mind is truly existent. There are assertions that even though both apprehended [objects] and apprehender [object-possessors] do not exist truly, the exalted wisdom that is the antidote is a truly existent thing. Many also seriously mistake the teaching in the scriptures that one must achieve the resultant buddhahood by purifying the stains of one’s present mind, and assert that the resultant exalted body and exalted wisdom exist in the continua of ordinary beings. Such assertions that the result is present at the time of the cause are exactly the Samkhya system, and such is called “production from self.”

Regarding this mode, Dharmakirti’s [Commentary on [Dignaga’s] ‘Compendium of Valid Cognition’ (Pramanavarttikakarika)] says:

*Other than the cows, the Samkhyas,
[Who would attempt to express with amazement,
Saying, “A hundred elephants exist upon the tip of the grass and the like,
Not being seen at an earlier time”]²⁶⁷*

And the Venerable Protector Maitreya says:

*Not seeing the existence of something is the seeing of its non-existence –
What is such a type of darkness?*

3B2B-2B3D-1B3B-3B. Reason of dependent-arising

9.142cd How does that which is considered to be true
By confusion differ from an illusion?

²⁶⁷ The First Dalai Lama Gyalwa Gendun Drup says in his commentary to Dharmakirti’s work (Tibetan page 131):

The subject – object of knowing – other than the cow-like Samkhyas, who would attempt to express with amazement, saying, “The results of a hundred elephants exist upon the tip of the grass and the like, the causes, in a manner of not being seen at an earlier time”? (The root text here corresponds to the ACIP text page 113B. The additional line of the root text translated here reads “ngo mtsar bcas pa su brjod rtzol.”) It follows that it is unreasonable. For, how can the results exist in the entity of the causes? They will not, because, even if the causes were to be divided a hundred times, the entity of the result, the entity that will appear does not appear earlier at the time of the cause.

- 9.143 Whatever is emanated by an illusionist and
 Whatever is emanated by causes
 Should be investigated as to
 Where they come from and also where they go to. {474}
- 9.144 Whatever [results] seen due to proximity,
 But not if they are absent,
 Are fabrications, similar to reflections.
 How can they be truly existent?

How does this thing which is considered and imputed to be true by ignorance, afflicted confusion, differ from an illusion, a dream, a reflection, and so forth? For, while it is empty of being inherently existent, it appears inherently existent. Whatever illusion horse, elephant, and so forth that are emanated by an illusionist and whatever thing that is emanated by causes and conditions should be investigated. If they are inherently existent, and if they must come from another at the time of production and must go somewhere at the time of cessation, then where do they come from and also where do they go to? Since there is no inherent existence, it is said: “The subject – the person and the aggregates – do not exist inherently because they are dependent-arisings, just as in the case of reflections.”

Whatever results such as compositional [action], sprouts, and so forth seen to be produced due to proximity to the causes such as ignorance, seeds, and so forth, but are not produced if those causes are absent, are fabrications, thereby they are similar to reflections. How can they be truly existent? They are not. The four [lines] “illusion” [and so forth in 9.143] prove the pervasion of the sign of dependent-arisings. Then, two and a half lines [in 9.144abc] indicate the reason, then half a line [in 9.144c] the analogy, and the last [9.144d] the thesis. For, Yongdzin Tamje Khyenpa’s *Great Mind Training* also says {475}:

Since all outer and inner things only arise in dependence on their own causes and conditions, contemplate that there is not even an atom of true existence. Further, it is taught that one must reflect upon this by applying various analogies such as illusions, dreams, and reflections. Also from among these, the Foremost Tamche Khyenpa [Tsongkhapa] repeatedly taught that this contemplation in according with the analogy of the reflection is easy to realize, and would make a big difference in the generation of ascertainment with respect to dependent-arising.

And:

From among the infinite reasonings taught in order to seek the profound Middle-Way view, this reasoning is the supreme. All existing reasonings of the view take this as their basis and must only do so.

The glorious Chandrakirti’s says [in his *Supplement to the Middle Way (Madhyamakavatara)* 6.115]:

*Because things strongly arise dependently,
These conceptions cannot [bear] investigation.*

*Therefore this reasoning of dependent arising
Cuts all nets of bad views.*

The *Sutra Requested by Anavatapta (Anavatap Tanagara Japariprccha Sutra)* says:

*That produced from conditions is not produced.
It does not have the nature of production.
Whatever is contingent on conditions is explained to be empty.
One who understands emptiness is conscientious.*

[Nagarjuna's] *Commentary on the Mind of Enlightenment (Bodhicitta-vivaraṇa)* says:

*Having understood the emptiness of phenomena,
Action and results are dependents.
This is more amazing than the amazing;
This is more marvelous than the marvelous. {476}*

3B2B-2B3D-1B3B-3C. Reason of existence and non-existence, production and cessation

- 9.145 With respect to things that exist,
What need is there for a cause?
Yet even if it does not exist,
What need is there for a cause?
- 9.146 Even by billions of causes,
A non-thing is not transformed.
How could that state be a thing?
Also what else is that transformed into a thing?
- 9.147 If, when non-existent, it is not possible for a thing to exist,
Then at what point does a thing become existent?
Without a thing becoming produced,
It will not become free from being non-thing.
- 9.148 If it does not become free from being non-thing,
The state of existent thing is impossible.
A thing also does not become a non-[thing]
Because it would follow as being in two natures.
- 9.149 In this way, there is no cessation and
Also things do not exist. Therefore,
All these migrating beings are
Always not produced and not ceased.
- 9.150 Migrating beings are like a dream;
When analyzed, they resemble a plantain tree.
Also having passed and not having passed beyond sorrow,

Are not different in thusness.

With respect to things that exist inherently, what need is there for a cause? For, the inherently existent does not need production. Yet even if the result does not exist, what need is there for a cause? For, it cannot be produced. Since all results do not exist at the time of their cause and are only produced, they are not refuted; rather the production of the utterly non-existent is refuted. The production of an existent result is refuted. Also, (i) the assertion that it exists at the time of the cause, and (ii) the assertion of the Samkhyas that most [objects] exist inherently are refuted. Saying “Because it has already been produced, it does not need production” transcends the path of reasoning. {477} Therefore causes and results which are empty of inherent existence are asserted to be illusory and like reflections.

The proof that a non-thing is unsuitable as an object that is a causal agent is as follows.

OPINION: Since the existent is already established, it does not need to be produced. However, why would the non-existent not arise?

RESPONSE: Even by billions of causes, a non-thing is not transformed into a thing, because nothing whatsoever can make a non-thing into a thing. If it is transformed, then the state of a non-thing is either forsaken or not forsaken. In the first case, how could the state of a non-thing be a thing? For, the states of being able and being unable to perform a function are contradictory. In the second case, it would transform into a thing from a thing and a non-thing; also what is it other than the two causes? For, this is impossible.

Furthermore, in the case of the state of non-thing not being forsaken, if, when the thing is non-existent, it is not possible for a thing to exist, then at what point does a thing become existent? For, a thing is not produced at the time of being non-existent. Furthermore, if it becomes so having forsaken the state of being non-thing, without a thing becoming produced, it will not become free from being non-thing. And if it does not become free from non-thing, the state of existent thing is impossible, because the two states are contradictory. A non-thing does not become a thing, and likewise, a thing also does not become a non-thing, because if it were half thing and half non-thing, then a singularity would follow as being established in two natures. {478} These reasonings refute the production of all – the utterly non-existent and the non-things. The subject – a sprout – is not inherently produced because an existent is neither inherently not produced nor inherently produced, just as in the case of the son of a barren woman.

Even though the production of what is non-existent at the time of its cause is [not] refuted, inherent production of that non-existent (at the time of its cause) when it is produced is refuted. Thus qualifications are applied to the object of refutation.

In the manner explained above previously, production does not exist inherently. In this way, there is no inherent cessation and also things do not exist inherently. Therefore, all these migrating beings are always not inherently produced and inherently ceased. Pacified from the very beginning, they are just natural nirvana.

Migrating beings of [cyclic] existence are like a dream, because, even though they do not exist inherently, they abide individually without the actions and the agents being mixed. When analyzed with the reasoning analyzing suchness, they resemble a plantain tree, because, even though they appear like they are self-instituting, they lack even the slightest inherently existent essence.

As to whether or not a position constitutes analysis of suchness: (i) without being satisfied with mere imputations of name conventions, due to desiring to search for the manner in

which the basis (upon which the convention operates) exists, the analysis constitutes an analysis of suchness, (ii) otherwise, being satisfied with mere imputation of conventions, the analysis of whether or not Devadatta has come or not, and the like constitutes analysis of conventions. {479} Also (a) having passed beyond sorrow – where one has been released from the bondage of attachment and so forth – and (b) not having passed beyond sorrow – where one is incarcerated in the prison of cyclic existence – are not different in suchness.

It is just as it has been said in the *King of Meditative Stabilization Sutra (Samadhirajasutra)*²⁶⁸:

*The migrating beings of cyclic existence are like dreams.
In this, there is no birth; nobody dies...*

And the *Superior Requested by Nye-wa-khor [Sutra]*²⁶⁹ says:

*If one has comprehended the natures of phenomena,
Then all results do not exist; there is also no attainment of results...*

Yongdzin Rinpoche's *Great Mind-Training* also clearly says:

If these outer and inner things exist inherently, then they either exist at the time of their cause, or they do not. If they exist at the time of their cause, then, since they are already established, there is no need for them to be produced²⁷⁰. If they do not, then, like the horns of a rabbit, nobody will be able to produce them. Hence, when analyzing with reasoning, contemplate that this so-called “production,” besides merely imputed by conception, is not established by way of its own entity.

This reasoning is also clearly taught in [Atisha]'s *Lamp on the Path to Enlightenment (Bodhi-patha-pradipa)* [in stanza 48]:

*An existent's arising is impossible;
A non-existent's is like flowers in the sky;
For a thing to be both is absurd fallacy;
So neither do they originate together.*

Thus, just as in all of the stated reasonings to search for the view that have been previously explained above, having first identified well the object of refutation, {480} place that as an object of the mind and refute it with the reasonings. Without contacting the object of refutation, if one posits that the I does not exist since one's hands, head, legs, and so forth are not the I, then this becomes a deprecation of conventionalities; calling the emptiness in which [the I] is not found after having analyzed in this manner “the emptiness that is created by the mind” and “the emptiness that demolishes conventionalities,” the Great Trailblazers considered this extremely contemptuous. Something like that is not

²⁶⁸ Source cited in *The Great Stages of the Path of Enlightenment*, Vol. 1, page 398: n. 411

²⁶⁹ This seems to be a section of the longer sutra *Piles of Jewels (Ratna-kuta)*.

²⁷⁰ *Rgyus* emended to read *skyed*.

difficult at all. Anyone can understand that “The overhanging lip, the neck, and so forth of the vase are not the vase,” “The hands, legs, and so forth are not the body,” and the like.

However, it has been taught that, let alone generating the profound Middle-Way view in the continuum of a being with little merit, it is very difficult to even to gain a mere understanding, because [Nagarjuna’s] *Precious Garland* (*Rajaparikatharatnavali*) (stanza 1.25):

*The doctrines of definite goodness
Are said by the Conquerors
To be deep, subtle and frightening
To the childish, who are not learned.*

[Chandrakirti’s] *Supplement to the Middle Way* (*Madhyamakavatara*) (13.4ab in the conclusion) also says:

*This profound and frightening thusness that has been explained will be certainly
realized by beings with previous familiarity;
It will not be comprehended by others, even though they may have listened extensively.*

3B2B-2B3D-1C. Advice that it is appropriate to make effort in realizing emptiness²⁷¹

- 9.151 In things which are empty in this way,
What attainment is there? What loss is there?
Who will be honored or
Despised by whom?
- 9.152 Where does happiness or suffering come from?
What is there to be displeased about? What is there to be pleased about?
When searched for in thusness, {481}
What craves and what does it crave for?
- 9.153 Upon analysis, what is this transitory support of the living
That will die here?
Who will arise, and who has arisen?
Who is an associate? Also who is a friend?
- 9.154 May those who are like me
Apprehend all as being like space.
Those who desire happiness themselves,
By means of the causes of conflict and delight,
- 9.155 Are agitated and joyful.
They live miserably
Through sorrow, struggles, disputes,

²⁷¹ It previously appears as “3B2B-2B3D-1C. Advice to make effort in generating wisdom.”

Cutting and stabbing each other and negativities.

- 9.156 After repeatedly going to the good migrations and
Enjoying much happiness again and again,
They die and fall into the sufferings of the bad migrations
Which are unbearable for a long time.
- 9.157 There are many pitfalls in [cyclic] existence.
Without reality there, like this,
There is mutual contradiction.
Therefore there is no such thusness in [cyclic] existence.
- 9.158 Transcend the limits of the ocean of suffering
Which is incomparable and unbearable also there.
Strength is weak there;
And the life span is short there as well.
- 9.159 There, too, in activities for long life and health,
In hunger and fatigue,
In sleep and detriment, and likewise
In meaningless associations with the childish,
- 9.160 Life passes by swiftly without purpose.
Discrimination is very difficult to gain there.
How could there be a method to overcome
Habitual distractions there?
- 9.161 There, too, maras strive in order that
One falls into the great bad migrations.
There, wrong paths are abundant,
And doubt is difficult to overcome. {482}
- 9.162 Leisure is hard to gain again.
The arising of a buddha is extremely rare.
The river of afflictions will be difficult to abandon.
Alas, suffering flows!
- 9.163 These abiding in the river of suffering,
Who, although suffering immensely in this way,
Do not see their own suffering.
Woe, they are pitiful.
- 9.164 It is just like one who repeatedly washes himself
And then enters fire again and again,
So he prides himself in being happy,
Although he abides in immense suffering.

- 9.165 Those abiding like this, behaving as though
There is no aging and death,
First they are killed
And then go to the unbearable bad migrations.
- 9.166 Thus, when might I pacify
Those tormented by the fire of suffering,
With the rain of accumulations of happiness
Springing forth excellently from the clouds of my merit?
- 9.167 When shall I respectfully collect the accumulation of merit
In a manner of non-objectification
And teach emptiness
To those ruined by objectification?

In things which are empty of inherent existence in the way previously explained above, if one were to evaluate from the side of inherent existence, due to what gain will one become attached? What attainment is there? What gain is lost? Will one generate anger? What loss is there? There is not the slightest. Who will be benefited or also harmed in being either honored or despised by whom?

For the sake of obtaining and abandoning why does one make effort? Where does the true cause of happiness or suffering come from? {483} What undesirable object is there to be displeased about? What desirable object is there to be pleased about²⁷²? When searched for in thusness with the reasoning that analyzes the meaning of the mode of abidance, what craver craves for what basis that generates craving, and what object of observation does it crave for? For, the three wheels of craving are not inherently existent.

Upon analysis regarding karma, the accumulator of karma, and so forth in this way, what is this sentient being [that is imputed by taking the aggregates that are the transitory collection as the basis of imputation]²⁷³, the transitory support of the living, that will die here in this [cyclic] existence? For, dying is not inherently existent.

Who will arise in a future life, and who has arisen in a past life? Who is a helpful associate? Also who is an affectionate friend? For, nothing is even slightly inherently existent. Thus by realizing the meaning of the mode of abidance, make effort to neutralize the eight worldly concerns, because Yongdzin Tamje Khyenpa says:

When one analyzes the profound meaning of the mode of abidance with the wisdom of individual investigation, and reflects upon it, by contemplating how all of endowment, deprivation, happiness, suffering, fame, disrepute, praise and blame, besides being mere names and mere appearances to the mind, do not have even an atom of true existence, neutralize the eight concerns and meditate on love and compassion for the sentient beings who have not realized such a meaning.

²⁷² *Dgar ci yod* added according to the root text.

²⁷³ Annotated in accordance with p. 673 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa's commentary.

May those who are like me, the author of the text, apprehend all phenomena as being like space, {484} because doing that cuts the root of [cyclic] existence and is the *principal* path for proceeding to omniscience. “Those who are like me” [expresses] the humility of the author. “Principal” [signifies] that it is advice for ordinary beings who have not realized suchness.

Although desiring happiness themselves also in this life, they do not transcend the force of suffering. They themselves and others are agitated and take joy by means of the causes of conflict with enemies and delight in associates. It seems that they must live miserably by way of great fruitless hardship through sorrow when desires are not fulfilled, struggles for the sake of desires, disputes with others, oneself and others cutting and stabbing each other’s bodies, and in addition, accumulating infinite negativities, such as those of speech and mind. Hence the wise ones do not crave the marvels of this life.

Through the force of meeting just this time with the spiritual teacher, after repeatedly going to the good migrations briefly like a flash of lightning and enjoying much happiness again and again, they die and fall into the rough, hot, and unpleasant sufferings of the bad migrations – the unbearable great hells for long infinite eons. Since one must experience infinite sufferings there, one should contemplate the drawbacks of the bad migrations.

Reflect upon the general drawbacks of [cyclic] existence as follows. There are many pitfalls that are the harms of suffering in [cyclic] existence of the desire, form and formless realms. {485} The causes of not transcending them are as follows. Without understanding the method for becoming freed from the suffering of [cyclic] existence as it really is, on the occasion of being bound like this by the noose of [cyclic] existence, there is mutual contradiction. Therefore there is nothing but solely circling in cyclic existence due to superimposition of things (that contradict the causes of liberation) as true when one does not understand suchness. When circling in [cyclic] existence, there is no such understanding of thusness, whereby one should make effort to realize emptiness since one will experience the transcendence of the limits of the ocean of the incomparable unbearable suffering also in [cyclic] existence. Even though one may be born into a good migration in [cyclic] existence, the strength for accomplishing virtue is weak there; and the life span of the pleasures and endowments of the support for accomplishing virtue is short there as well.

On the occasion of abiding slightly there, too, in activities for the methods in the hope of a long life, cleansing, massage²⁷⁴, and the like, and the causes of health, such as relying on medicine, in hunger and sudden fatigue, in sleep and detriment of various outer and inner harms, and likewise in meaningless associations with childish negative companions and so forth, without time to practice the Dharma, this life is discarded quickly, that is, it passes by swiftly without purpose and disintegrates. Discrimination regarding the meaning of suchness, the cause of transcending [cyclic] existence, is very difficult to gain there, thereby one should make effort in the methods for reversing cyclic existence. {486}

OPINION: It would be sufficient to reverse cyclic existence by meditating on the meaning of emptiness when one is reborn in a good migration.

RESPONSE: The habituation since beginningless lives in cyclic existence with adhering to things as truly existent and distractions such as busyness in cyclic existence is very difficult to reverse, whereby how could there be a method to overcome it? For, the concordant conditions for reversing it are very few, and the adverse detrimental conditions are very plentiful. Even at the time of practicing slightly the excellent Dharma, there, too, maras such as Devaputra

²⁷⁴ *Skū mnye* emended to read *bku mnye* in accordance with p. 675 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

strive in order that one falls into the great bad migrations. Hence the adverse conditions to becoming freed from cyclic existence are many and are difficult to reverse.

OPINION: When one is reborn in a good migration, due to cultivating faith in the truths, the Three Jewels, and so forth, one will be freed from [cyclic] existence, whereby it is not difficult to gain.

RESPONSE: Even there, when born in a good migration, wrong paths that fall into the extremes of permanence and annihilation (which are discordant classes to the correct views) are abundant, one is led to them by wrong spiritual guides, and doubt in which one has misgivings about the correct path is difficult to overcome since the outer and inner conditions for eliminating doubt are difficult to gain.

OPINION: Even though I may not gain it in this life, it is sufficient that I search out a spiritual teacher and practice in the next life.

RESPONSE: If one does not make effort well when one has gained a spiritual teacher in this life, leisure is hard to gain again from the next life onwards. The arising of a buddha in the world is extremely rare. Hence it is very difficult to also meet a spiritual teacher.

Even though one has already met a spiritual teacher and obtained a good support of leisures and endowments, if one does not make effort well with conscientiousness, {487} the river of afflictions will be difficult to cross, because one should make effort continuously until liberation is attained.

“Alas” has the meaning of discouragement and disheartenment; suffering flows one after another, hence there is great suffering. For, although one may become free from one suffering, one falls into another suffering again. Hence, at the time of having obtained the leisures and endowments, one should make effort in reflecting upon the drawbacks of cyclic existence.

These sentient beings abiding in the river of suffering, who, although suffering immensely in this way, hold suffering as happiness, do not see that they are sinking²⁷⁵ in their own suffering. Out of compassion, by means of thinking, “Woe, how wonderful it would be if they were free from suffering!” one should make effort in cultivating great compassion since sentient beings sunk in the mud of suffering are pitiful.

It is just like some non-Buddhist, deceived by wrong teachers, who repeatedly washes himself and then enters fire again and again, so he prides himself in being happy by holding that itself to be the method for attaining liberation, although he abides in immense suffering due to being tormented by austerities of the body.

Those sentient beings abiding like this, behaving as though they are foe-destroyers with no aging and death, in stages, first they are killed by the unpretentious Lord of Death who is not one to be hated, and then go to the unbearable suffering of falling into the three bad migrations. {488}

Thus in the manner previously explained above, having contemplated well the way in which those who have come into the stream of unbearable suffering are tortured by suffering, through observing those sentient beings tormented by the fire of suffering in this way, I wonder, when might I pacify the suffering of their bad migrations, with necessities of happiness, such as medicine and food, springing forth excellently from the clouds of my merit of generosity and so forth? Meditate on great compassion, thinking, “If only sentient beings

²⁷⁵ *Byid* emended to read *bying* in accordance with p. 677 of Thubten Chokyi Dragpa’s commentary.

can be liberated from the suffering of the bad migrations! May they be liberated! I shall liberate them!”

Make wishes in the following way to be the causes of freedom from the suffering of cyclic existence. When shall I respectfully collect the accumulation of merit of generosity and so forth, the methods for that, in a manner of possessing the wisdom of non-objectification, the realization of emptiness of inherent existence of all phenomena, and teach emptiness for the sake of pacifying the suffering of cyclic existence to those sentient beings ruined in cyclic existence by objectification that adheres to true existence? Wondering like this, meditate on great compassion, thinking, “If only sentient beings can be free from the suffering of cyclic existence! I shall liberate them!”

A fully qualified great love and compassion included within the mahayana path must wish to place [sentient beings] in the perfect complete buddhahood that possesses every happiness and is free from all suffering. {489}

In brief, one should meditate on the meaning of the mode of abidance in dependence on calm abiding. Further, the I, when one thinks of “I,” is nothing but posited as a mere imputation upon the aggregates; it is not established inherently, by way of its own character, in a manner of independent abidance even in the slightest. Thus the existence of a person is merely imputed by convention of name. Having been imputed, it exists. It is only existent in a manner of reliance. That is all. Thus it lacks inherent existence. Thinking like this, take it to mind. You should likewise contemplate by applying this to all phenomena such as the aggregates.

Thus on this occasion of having obtained just once a support in which the pleasures and endowments are complete, you must make effort in the methods for generating in your continuum the profound Middle-Way view. As long as one has not gained the good fortune of relying by way of thought and application upon an excellent spiritual teacher who gives proper instructions on the mode of profound suchness, it will be difficult to realize even a portion of the Middle-Way path of dependent-arising which is free from the extremes. And through proper reliance upon [such a spiritual teacher], all excellent accumulations will arise. Gyeltshab Tamche Khyenpa Rinpoche²⁷⁶ says:

*Until I found the excellent venerable [Tsongkhapa],
I had not realized even a portion of
Dependent-arising, the middle free from extremes,
The path that severs the root of [cyclic] existence.*

*All of whatever good explanations are present in me
Is the kindness of the guru.
May this virtue become the cause
For all my mothers to meet the mahayana [spiritual] friend! {490}*

Following this passage he advises that one must strive quickly to properly accomplish with effort by relying on the spiritual teacher:

²⁷⁶ From [Gyeltshab’s] *Explanation of (Shantideva’s) “Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds”*: Entrance of Victors’ Children.

A Precious Garland

*Without realizing the principle of the middle free from extremes,
One will not be able to contact the state of the supreme aryas.
Hence, having decisively analyzed that emptiness means dependent-arising,
Strive to properly accomplish with effort.*

*Proponents of the two truths of Nagarjuna's excellent system,
Difficult to find even in billions of eons,
Will vanish from this land before too long.
Therefore, discriminating ones, quickly generate joyous effort!*

3B2B-2B3D-2. Title of the chapter

*The Ninth Chapter on The Perfection of Wisdom from Engaging in the Deeds of a
Bodhisattva.*

This is easy to understand.